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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. This South Carolina Catastrophic Incident Response Plan (CIRP) enhances the 
policies and procedures the South Carolina Emergency Management Division 
(SCEMD) and the South Carolina Emergency Response Team (SERT) will use in 
coordinating an accelerated, proactive state response to a catastrophic incident. 
B. A catastrophic event is any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism that 
results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or destruction severely 
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, the morale of the 
population, and/or government functions. 
C. A catastrophic event could result in sustained impacts to a local jurisdiction(s) or 
the State over a prolonged period of time. 
D. A catastrophic event often exceeds the resources normally available to the 
counties and/or State almost immediately and interrupts government operations 
and services inside and out of the impacted area. 
II. PURPOSE 
A. Provide procedures that allow emergency management officials to effectively and 
efficiently coordinate the application of local, State, and federal resources in 
response to a catastrophic event to prevent loss of life, minimize damage to 
property, and protect the environment. 
B. Provide emergency managers at the state and local-level a methodology to 
respond to catastrophic events even though resources may be initially 
overwhelmed. 
C. Identifies the additional resources available to local jurisdictions and the State to 
prepare for, respond to and recover from a catastrophic event. 
D. Establishes the strategies for implementing and coordinating the State response, 
and reception and distribution of federal assets at an accelerated pace in response 
to a catastrophic incident. 
III. SCOPE 
A. Incorporates the guidance within the National Response Framework (NRF), the 
Catastrophic Incident Annex to the NRF, and the Federal Catastrophic Incident 
Supplement.  
B. Includes nine (9) response and action plans for catastrophic events that may affect 
South Carolina. 
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IV. ASSUMPTIONS 
A. A catastrophic incident will occur with little or no warning.  Some incidents may 
be well underway before detection. 
B. Multiple incidents will occur simultaneously or sequentially in contiguous and/or 
noncontiguous areas.  Some incidents, such as a biological Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) attack, may be dispersed over a large geographic area and 
lack a defined incident site. 
C. A catastrophic incident will result in large numbers of casualties and/or displaced 
persons, possibly in the tens to hundreds of thousands.  During a catastrophic 
incident response, priority is given to human life-saving operations. 
D. The nature and scope of a catastrophic incident will quickly overwhelm the State, 
tribal and local response capabilities, and will require Federal support. 
E. The response capabilities of local jurisdictions are likely to be insufficient and 
quickly overwhelmed.  Local first responders may be among those affected and 
unable to perform their duties. 
F. A detailed and credible common operating picture will not be achievable for 24-
48 hours (or longer) after the incident.  As a result, response activities may have 
to begin without the benefit of a detailed or complete situation and critical needs 
assessment, and without federal assistance. 
G. Federal response resources are not likely to provide significant lifesaving or life-
sustaining capabilities until 18-48 hours after the event. 
H. The nature and scope of the catastrophic incident will include major natural or 
manmade hazards including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-
yield explosive attacks, and cyber attacks. 
I. A catastrophic incident will produce environmental impacts that severely 
challenge the ability and capacity of governments and communities to achieve a 
timely recovery. 
J. Large-scale evacuations, organized or self-directed, may occur. 
K. Existing health care systems in the impacted area will quickly overwhelmed, 
requiring evacuation of existing patients from these facilities to accommodate 
increased patient workload if the facility remains operational. 
L. There will be significant issues regarding environmental health and public health 
needs, including mental health, in the aftermath of a catastrophic event. 
M. Persons with special needs, including residents of nursing homes and extended 
care facilities, will require special attention during evacuation. 
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N. Large numbers of people will be left temporarily or permanently homeless and 
may require prolonged temporary housing.  Some displaced people will require 
specialized attention, healthcare assistance, and assistance with activities of daily 
living based on their special needs. 
O. A large number of household pets and service animals will require appropriate 
care, sheltering, medical attention, and transportation. 
P. A catastrophic incident will have significant intra and interstate dimensions, 
including impacts on the health and welfare of adjacent areas and states and their 
populations, interstate trade, transit, law enforcement coordination, and others 
areas. 
V. SITUATION 
A. South Carolina is subject to a variety of possible catastrophic events.  These 
include, but are not limited to hurricanes, earthquakes, radiological hazards, 
severe weather, dam failures, terrorism, WMD incidents, or Hazardous Material 
(HAZMAT) accidents. 
B. A catastrophic event or incident can occur with or without warning.  When a 
catastrophic event occurs, the response should follow a prescribed process.  The 
local jurisdiction should establish an initial response utilizing the Incident 
Command System (ICS) to control and direct the first response. 
C. The state will coordinate and provide support as needed when local and regionally 
available resources become overwhelmed. 
D. The State will implemented this Plan upon awareness of a catastrophic event or 
when incidents overwhelm the local capability to respond. 
E. In events where existing response plans are in place (e.g. – hurricanes, 
earthquakes, dam failure, etc.), the State will utilize this Appendix in conjunction 
with those plans. 
VI. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A. Catastrophic Preparedness 
1. As defined in the South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP), 
all actions and responses within this Appendix and its accompanying 
Annexes will be in accordance with the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS). 
2. Catastrophic events require a comprehensive approach to prepare, 
respond, mitigate and recover from. This section outlines the operational 
concepts that the state will apply to that event. 
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3. A catastrophic incident is not limited to natural hazards; it may also 
include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high yield explosive 
attacks, disease epidemics, and major natural or man-made hazards. 
Individual annexes to this plan in conjunction with the SCEOP and this 
plan comprise SCEMD’s operational response to catastrophic events. 
4. Support actions must commence immediately in order to save lives, 
prevent human suffering, and mitigate severe damage.  Accordingly, state 
and federal assets will require mobilization and deployment before they 
are requested through normal protocols. 
5. Multiple incidents may occur simultaneously or sequentially in contiguous 
and/or noncontiguous areas.  Some incidents, such as a biological WMD 
attack, may be dispersed over a large geographic area, and lack a defined 
incident site.  Response actions at every jurisdictional level must be 
coordinated to adequately mitigate such events. 
6. County-identified Operational Areas will form the basis for a State 
response to a catastrophic incident (See Attachment A – Operational Area 
Concept). 
7. Local jurisdictions have the primary responsibility to prepare for and 
respond to incidents and disasters.  As such, they must be prepared to 
manage initial emergency response and recovery activities for at least the 
first 72 hours through internal capabilities and/or mutual aid agreements, 
regardless of the size and scope of the incident.  Although State 
government will make every effort to provide additional life safety support 
as quickly as possible, State and federal resources may not be available in 
the early stages of an emergency. 
8. Damage to transportation (roads, bridges, rail, air, etc.), communication 
(phone, cell, emergency 911, public warning sirens, etc.), utility 
distribution systems (electric, gas, and water, etc.), pipelines, chemical and 
fuel storage, and other infrastructure systems, will isolate communities, 
creating virtual islands within the disaster areas.  Damaged transportation 
routes may not be functional for many weeks or months.  Alternate routes 
will have to be identified and opened. 
9. The Governor may suspend some governmental operations in the affected 
areas and/or other areas of the State (as required) to direct maximum 
utilization of available resources in the initial response. 
B. Activation 
1. This Appendix can be activated for any event at the direction of the 
SCEMD Director. 
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2. State response to a catastrophic event within a county or counties will start 
with the activation of this Appendix.  The types of events that can trigger 
the activation of this Appendix include: 
 Earthquake of 6.0 magnitude or greater 
 Category 3 or greater hurricane 
 WMD event 
 HAZMAT spill requiring mass evacuations or causing mass 
casualties 
 Pandemic influenza outbreak 
 Large airplane crash 
 Fixed Nuclear Facility (FNF) radiological accident resulting in a 
Site Area Emergency or General Emergency 
3. A catastrophic event can occur that does not immediately appear to meet 
the accepted definition of a catastrophic incident.  Some examples could 
include a bird influenza outbreak, a drought, a terrorist attack, or a forest 
fire. 
4. Once a catastrophic event occurs, the first priorities are to preserve life, 
property, the environment, and the social and economic structure of the 
affected communities. 
C. Immediate Response 
1. Upon activation of this appendix, the State Emergency Operations Center 
(SEOC) will activate at a minimum level of Operational Condition 
(OPCON) 3. 
2. SCEMD will notify the SC Forestry Commission to put two of the State’s 
Type 3 Incident Management Teams (IMT) on standby to respond to the 
incident. 
3. Where existing plans are in place (earthquake, radiological, etc.), they will 
be supplemented by this plan. 
4. The State SERT will adopt a “push” doctrine for catastrophic events.  The 
SERT will initially push assets to include material and personnel to the 
incident site. 
5. The Logistics Division of EMD will review all contingency contracts, and 
ready appropriate contracts for implementation. 
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D. Resources for Response 
1. Immediate resources are available to respond from outside the affected 
area. 
2. These resources can be requested and activated through Mutual Aid 
Agreements, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and through the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) by the local 
Incident Command (IC) or the SEOC. 
3. See Attachment B (SC Catastrophic Resources) for a list of available 
state-level resources. 
E. Emergency Communications.  The State will push communication assets into the 
affected area(s) to ensure information flow.  (See Annex C - State Operational 
Area Communications Plan). 
F. National Planning Scenarios. 
1. The National Response Framework, along with Strategy for Homeland 
Security, states that all states should develop responses based on the 15 
National Planning Scenarios. 
2. See Attachment D (National Incident Scenario Response Plans) for South 
Carolina’s response to the scenarios. 
G. If the local authorities are unable to establish or maintain an effective incident 
command structure due to catastrophic conditions; the State, at the direction of the 
Governor, may establish a unified command structure to save lives, protect 
property, secure critical infrastructure, or contain the event.  The State will revert 
to a supporting role once the local authorities are able to reestablish command. 
H. Federal Coordination 
1. SCEMD will start coordination with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) immediately upon activation of this appendix. 
2. The FEMA Region IV Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) 
will identify and make assets available to the state. 
a. SCEMD will coordinate with FEMA for mobilization and 
deployment of required mission assignments. 
b. FEMA will utilize advanced readiness contracts to acquire needed 
assistance to bring the catastrophic incident under control. 
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c. In coordination with FEMA, SCEMD will arrange the in-flow of 
federal support to ensure resources are made available and 
prioritized in the requested timeframe. 
3. Sustained Response 
Once the initial response has been developed, the focus at the state level 
becomes maintaining situational awareness and coordinating additional 
support to maintain capabilities to bring the situation under control and 
return to steady state operations. 
4. Demobilization 
a. Demobilization planning will start as soon as practical. 
b. Operations based upon this plan will be terminated in phases as 
conditions permit.  However, the State could operate a catastrophic 
incident response well into the Recovery phase. 
c. Operations under this Appendix will terminate or transition to 
other plans as the situation permits. 
VII. ACTIONS BY PHASE 
A. Preparedness 
1. Planning and training for a catastrophic incident is an on-going cycle that 
must be continually reviewed by conducting exercises that test response to 
a catastrophic incident and conducting After Action Reviews (AAR) upon 
completion of all exercises. 
2. All agencies having coordinating and cooperating responsibilities will 
develop appropriate Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to support this 
plan. 
3. The State will activate this Appendix in accordance with FEMA plans to 
ensure a coordinated strategy for receiving, deploying, and integrating the 
pre-identified resources reflected in the national Catastrophic Incident 
Response Execution Schedule. 
B. Response 
1. State Response 
a. The SERT will determine risk and potential impact to State and 
counties. 
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b. Assist local jurisdictions in determining scope, scale, and extent of 
damage a catastrophic event has caused. 
c. Coordinate and execute plan. 
2. Federal Response 
a. Upon recognition that a catastrophic incident condition/incident 
exists, the Secretary of Homeland Security immediately begins, 
potentially in advance of a formal Presidential disaster declaration, 
implementation of the NRF-CIA.  Upon notification from the 
National Operations Center (NOC) that the NRF-CIA has been 
implemented, federal departments and agencies immediately: 
(1) Take actions to activate, mobilize, and deploy incident-
specific resources in accordance with the NRF-Catastrophic 
Incident Supplement. 
(2) Take actions to protect life, property, and critical 
infrastructure under their jurisdiction, and provide 
assistance within the affected area. 
(3) Commence those hazard-specific activities established 
under the appropriate and applicable NRF Incident 
Annex(es) including the NRF-Catastrophic Incident 
Supplement. 
(4) Commence functional activities and responsibilities 
established under the NRF ESF Annexes. 
b. The federal response is designed to address no notice to short 
notice incidents of catastrophic magnitude.  When these type 
events occur, the federal government will “push” pre-designated 
resources to a federal mobilization center or directly into the 
impacted area. 
c. For catastrophic incidents where planning is possible, an 
appropriately tailored package of federal assets and resources will 
be pushed to the appropriate federal mobilization center or staging 
area and will deploy upon request from the SEOC. 
d. Incident-specific resources and capabilities are activated and 
prepared for deployment to a federal mobilization center or staging 
area near the incident site.  The development of site-specific 
catastrophic incident response strategies (as detailed in the NRF-
CIS) includes the pre-identification of incident-specific critical 
resource requirements and corresponding deployment/employment 
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strategies that accelerate the timely arrival of critically skilled 
resources and capabilities. 
e. Coordination and Deployment of Federal Assets 
(1)  Upon activation of the SERT for a catastrophic response, 
the FEMA Region IV RRCC will be notified of the 
catastrophic incident.  Any federal resources known to be 
needed at that time will be requested. 
(2) Any pre-scripted missions will also be activated to move 
the resources to the nearest Federal Mobilization Center.  If 
needed, the resources will be deployed to the incident site 
from the Federal Mobilization Center.  
C. Recovery 
1. Once immediate lifesaving activities are completed, the focus shifts to 
assisting individuals, families, and businesses in meeting basic needs and 
returning to self-sufficiency. 
a. Short-Term Recovery is the immediate recovery operations started 
during the response phase, including providing or re-establishing 
essential services, providing food, and re-opening transportation 
routes. It includes local, state, federal, non-governmental, and 
private sector assistance. 
b. Long-Term Recovery operations start during the response to a 
catastrophic incident.  However, the majority of the planning and 
recovery effort will occur after operations identified in this 
appendix have terminated. 
2. Reconstitution of Government Operations and Services 
a. The first priority is to re-establish local government and services. 
b. If the local government is not functioning due to a catastrophic 
event, the Governor may enact special powers and duties granted 
him under Section 25-1-440, SC Code of Laws, to institute 
provisional local governance until such time the local government 
can be reconstituted. 
3. Federal Actions 
a. The Joint Field Office (JFO) will be the primary coordination point 
for the federal government to organize and support recovery 
operations. 
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b. Some of the federal recovery actions include coordinating 
assistance programs to help individuals, families, and businesses 
meet basic needs and return to self-sufficiency, coordinating with 
private sector and non-governmental organizations involved in 
donations management, coordinating public assistance grant 
programs authorized by the Stafford Act, and coordinating 
mitigation grant programs to help restore and revitalize the 
affected community as well as reduce the impacts from future 
disasters. 
VIII. RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. South Carolina Emergency Management Division 
1. Overall responsible for implementation of this plan and to provide 
leadership, expertise and authorities for specific aspects of response. 
2. Verify a catastrophic incident has occurred and implement the immediate 
response. 
3. Notify the FEMA Region IV RRCC and request any needed federal 
resources. 
4. Ensure communication with affected jurisdictions. 
5. Ensure the timely deployment and flow of assets requested by the affected 
jurisdictions. 
6. In coordination with cooperating agencies, annually coordinate and update 
this plan. 
B. Supporting Agencies 
1. Upon notification of a catastrophic incident, activate and prepare for 
deployment of agency or Emergency Support Function (ESF) managed 
teams, equipment, and other resources. 
2. Commence ESF responsibilities as defined in the SCEOP. 
3. Initiate assessments of the probable consequences of the incident and 
projected resource requirements from internal resources and federal assets. 
4. Annually review and update this plan in coordination with SCEMD. 
IX. PLANS DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE 
A. SCEMD is the lead agency for development, coordination, review and updating of 
this plan. 
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B. Designated State departments and agencies are responsible for developing and 
maintaining portions of this Appendix. 
C. As a minimum, SCEMD will review and update this Appendix annual basis.  The 
review will include any changes in the NRF or other relevant State and federal 
guidance. 
X. ATTACHMENTS 
Attachment A Operational Area Concept 
Attachment B SC Catastrophic Resources 
Attachment C State Operational Area Communication Plan 
Attachment D National Incident Planning Scenarios 
ATTACHMENT A TO CATESTROPHIC INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN 
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SCCIRP 
Appendix 9-A-1 15 April 2015 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. A disaster (either natural or man-made) could have significant impacts resulting 
in isolated areas within the disaster zone.  Such conditions could effectively 
isolate communities from one another as well as from the rest of the State. 
B. The resulting damage will make movement of human and material resources to 
the affected areas difficult, resulting in the need to target specific areas with a 
significant response effort. 
C. To mitigate the effects of a disaster of any size and type, each county, in 
coordination with South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD), 
will develop Operational Areas and Operational Area response protocols within 
their respective areas of responsibility. 
D. Operational Areas allow for pre-impact planning to determine the baseline 
amounts and types of resources needed in a specific geographic area based on the 
population and infrastructure contained within each area. 
E. The use of Operational Areas allows for a more efficient use of scarce response 
resources, and allows the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) to better 
manage a catastrophic impact. 
II. PURPOSE 
A. Provides guidance and procedures for developing Operational Areas by the 
counties in the State.  This forms the basis for initial response and recovery 
planning to a disaster in an Operational Area.  
B. Describes how the State will develop and mobilize resources to support local 
emergency management efforts within their Operational Areas. 
III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A. The Operational Area concept will be implemented incrementally based on the 
magnitude and type of impact.  The counties determined to have the highest risk 
will have Operational Areas developed and documented first, followed by 
jurisdictions facing lesser risk. 
B. SCEMD has determined that coastal counties will undergo Operational Area 
development first, followed by jurisdictions more immediately inland, and finally 
all remaining counties. 
C. The initial implementation of Operational Areas is divided into two phases. 
1. Phase 1 was the initial briefing to each county by SCEMD and provided 
an overview of the Operational Area Program. 
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2. Phase 2 of the Operational Area Program requires action from the counties 
to define their Operational Area boundaries and to prioritize their critical 
infrastructure by Operational Area (generally accomplished in GIS by 
layering critical infrastructure with Operational Area boundaries). 
D. Operational Areas are established by dividing each county into several 
geographically delineated sub-areas based ideally on existing census tract borders.  
One or more census tracts can comprise an Operational Area. 
E. The Operational Areas are based on a number of other factors including potential 
infrastructure damage, natural and man-made barriers that could isolate an area, 
easily recognizable geographic features, population, and political boundaries.  
Operational Area boundaries are coordinated and developed by county officials 
with assistance from SCEMD. 
F. General guidance used to develop Operational Areas 
1. Whenever possible, Operational Areas should not subdivide a major 
population center (city). 
2. Each county will map its Operational Area boundaries in GIS and provide 
the GIS layer(s) to SCEMD for development of a statewide map of 
Operational Areas. 
3. Each Operational Area should have designated primary and alternate 
points of entry/exit and the ability through traffic control points to limit 
general access to an Operational Area during an emergency. 
4. Once each Operational Area boundary has been designed, the counties 
will identify all and prioritized critical infrastructures therein. 
a. Critical infrastructure is defined as “Systems and assets so vital to 
the county that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and 
assets would have a debilitating impact on the ability of a county to 
respond to an emergency, security, the local economy, public 
health, safety of the local population, or any combination of those 
matters.” 
b. The purpose of the critical infrastructure inventory is to provide 
information and location data vital to the response and recovery of 
the county. 
c. This information will be mapped using GIS.  The county EM 
agencies will maintain their county database, and SCEMD will 
maintain a statewide database, populated by each county’s critical 
infrastructure database. 
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d. Counties in coordination with SCEMD will review and update the 
data annually (January). 
G. Impact On Infrastructure 
1. In order to determine the effects on infrastructure, loss estimates are being 
prepared for each Operational Area to provide emergency responders site-
specific information.  Additionally, counties are advised to prioritize the 
critical infrastructure within each Operational Area in order to streamline 
response and resource decisions. 
2. Affected infrastructure includes, but is not limited to, transportation 
arteries, communications systems, public works and engineering outlets, 
firefighting resources, shelters, health and medical facilities, hazardous 
material sites, energy providers, law enforcement facilities, animal care 
facilities, special needs requirements, schools, day care, prisons, public 
recreational areas, transient populations, and governments (local, state, 
and federal). 
3. Critical Infrastructure Identification and Prioritization.  The designation of 
critical infrastructure priority levels is a county responsibility.  In 
coordination with the counties, SCEMD has identified four recommended 
priority levels of critical infrastructure: 
 Level 1 - Vital to the Operational Area or county, must stay 
operational at all times, or receive highest priority for immediate 
restoration (e.g., E911 facilities, major bridges, EOCs, etc.). 
 Level 2 - Any infrastructure within an Operational Area necessary 
to support initial rescue/recovery operations or to maintain public 
safety and must be operational or have restored capability within 
24 hours following a disaster (e.g., hospitals, police stations, fire 
stations, emergency shelters/ schools, etc.). 
 Level 3 - Any infrastructure that enhances long-term recovery 
operations.  Must be operational or returned to operational status 
within 48 hours following a disaster.  This is infrastructure that 
provides the capability for evacuees to return to an Operational 
Area (e.g., airports, electrical utilities, water treatment, pumping 
stations, sewage treatment plants, locations of deemed essential 
businesses, etc.). 
 Level 4 - All other infrastructure or systems deemed critical by 
local authorities. 
4. Equipment Response Packages (see Annex 1 for a list of the equipment 
response packages) 
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a. Selected Emergency Support Functions (ESF) will develop three 
levels of pre-planned response packages: Basic, Intermediate, and 
Advanced. 
(1) Basic Response Package – the basic capability to provide 
support.  For example, the basic response package for a 
route clearance mission might be two five-ton dump trucks, 
two drivers, one chain saw, hand tools, and radios. 
(2) Intermediate Response Package – a more robust capability.  
This might include adding a front-end loader and a road 
grader with operators to the basic response package to form 
the intermediate package. 
(3) Advanced Response Package - the most enhanced 
capabilities.  For example, it might be comprised of four 
dump trucks with operators, two chain saws, a front-end 
loader, a road grader, and a bulldozer. 
b. During response operations, the County EOC will transmit a 
request for additional support based upon initial damage 
assessments.  Also, with the knowledge of county response 
capabilities, the SEOC and ESF 1 (Transportation) can stage pre-
planned response packages to begin clearing the identified priority 
routes into the county and then begin, in coordination with the 
county, opening and maintaining the priority routes into and within 
the impacted Operational Areas.  Counties are strongly encouraged 
to use the WebEOC resource management tool to transmit these 
support requests. 
H. Logistics/Supply/Re-Supply/Sustainment. See Attachment A (SC Logistics Plan) 
to the SC Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP). 
I. Transportation, Traffic Management, and Reentry 
1. Transportation requirements will fall into two categories:  
 Requirements that support response operations 
 Requirements needed to support movement of personnel who are 
engaged in area operations. 
2. Transporting heavy equipment and other resources will require unique 
transportation solutions.  Transportation equipment to support the 
response effort will come initially from ESF 1 (Transportation) and from 
sources such as the military or private contractors. 
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3. Transportation required to support state-level logistical movements will be 
planned and executed in accordance with Attachment A (SC Logistics 
Plan) to the SCEOP. 
4. Specific, pre-planned entry routes will be used to transport resources into 
the Operational Areas.  Resources will be dispatched directly from the 
LSA to county receiving point(s) and/or onward to distribution points 
within the Operational Areas.  Whenever possible, relief supplies will 
“through put” directly to the PODs within the affected Operational Areas. 
The distribution points within the Operational Areas will receive and 
distribute disaster relief supplies to the affected population. 
5. Each Operational Area should have pre-planned primary and secondary 
entry and exit routes designated.  The routes will include not only the 
SCDOT “lifelines” but also the county priority routes into the specific 
Operational Areas.  State, county, and contactor assets will be used to 
reopen and maintain these routes.  The counties along with ESF 1 
(Transportation) will de-conflict who has the responsibility to open and 
maintain the routes.  Routes will be based upon several factors including, 
but not limited to, number of lanes, critical bridges, debris fields, and 
overpass height restrictions. 
6. Wherever possible, predetermined checkpoints should be identified and 
listed in the Operational Area critical infrastructure to assist with 
evacuation and to help maintain positive reentry control into Operational 
Areas.  Each county should develop reentry plans and control measures to 
assist with the management of the population as it reoccupies an 
Operational Area. 
7. Each Operational Area may be required to operate independently until 
entry routes are surveyed for damage and cleared of debris.  Priority of 
effort for route clearance will go to the pre-planned entry routes. The 
County EOC, ESF 1 (Transportation), and the SEOC will maintain route 
status. 
8. Alternate transportation entry points will be identified based on the 
premise that initial entry into the most severely impacted Operational 
Areas will only be by air, sea, or indirect land routes until primary entry 
routes are cleared of debris.  To facilitate operations under such 
conditions, counties are encouraged to identify and develop protocols for 
helicopter landing/pick up zones and potential drop zones to receive initial 
material and equipment.  Counties also need to identify areas and develop 
protocols for large-scale helicopter/fixed wing airhead operations. 
9. Traffic Management will include diversion routes to move traffic around 
blocked priority roadways and access routes to move into and within 
Operational Areas.  In coordination with the appropriate county officials 
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and the SEOC logistics group, ESF 1 (Transportation) will plan the 
diversion routing into the Operational Areas as required based on known 
route conditions. 
J. Communications 
1. As available, normal/pre-planned communications from the Operational 
Areas to the county and state EOCs will be used.  If communications 
capability is degraded due to disaster conditions, back-up communications 
will be used, and will consist of, but not be restricted to, conventional 
telephone, cellular, any type of compatible radio frequency such as LGR, 
800 MHz, etc., and satellite radio/telephone.  Personnel serving as ICs or 
liaisons in the Operational Areas will be equipped with and be prepared to 
use any of the communications assets noted above. 
2. The Regional Emergency Managers (REM) will be directed to report to 
one of the affected County EOCs by the SEOC.  The REMs will report to 
the county Emergency Director, and will assist the county in gathering 
information and providing communication support to the Operational 
Areas and to the SEOC. 
3. Per the Operational Area Communication Plan, the SEOC will deploy 
Level A communication teams to support impacted Operational Areas and 
counties.  The team(s) will report to the county EMD for assignment.  If 
the team is unable to establish contact with the EMD, the SEOC will 
position the team(s) based on guidance from the Director, SCEMD.  As 
the post-impact response continues, impacted Operational Areas will be 
prioritized and targeted for additional communications support based upon 
the state Operational Area Communication Plan.  The plan is robust 
enough to support multiple communication nodes in affected Operational 
Areas and counties. 
4. As the post impact Critical Needs Assessment is being conducted, ESF-2 
(Communications) and the counties will identify the communication 
systems still functioning in each Operational Area to include information 
on radio frequencies and mobile EOC capability, and to determine the 
available communications assets to meet the anticipated operational loads.  
Counties will request additional communication assets from the state 
through the SEOC. 
5. Counties will identify all communication assets available within an 
Operational Area as part of the critical infrastructure identification 
process. 
K. Operational Area Mapping 
1. Based on input received from counties, SCEMD will coordinate the 
development of GIS-layered maps describing county-identified 
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Operational Areas, entry/exit points, mobilization staging areas, LSAs, 
distribution points, diversion routes, access routes, and all designated 
critical infrastructure. 
2. The maps will be reviewed annually and updated as appropriate. 
IV. SCEMD ACTIONS 
A. Preparedness 
1. Develop and/or update Operational Area baseline impact and 
logistical/restoration support requirements. 
2. Source, train, and equip state Communication Teams. 
3. Update Operational Area Communications Plan to include resources 
located in each Operational Area. 
4. Update primary and alternate Operational Area entry and exit routes. 
5. With input from the counties, coordinate and/or update county and 
Operational Area logistics staging area and distribution site locations. 
6. Update State Logistics Plan with Operational Area unique planning factors 
and procedures. 
7. In coordination with the affected county, develop specific response plans 
for each potentially affected Operational Area to determine initial 
quantities/types of relief supplies, communications packages, and 
generators.  Determine staging points within the Operational Area or in the 
immediate vicinity. 
8. Based on annual updates provided by the counties, maintain critical 
infrastructure inventories for all Operational Areas. 
B. Response: 
1. Phase 1 
a. Activate the State Logistics Plan. 
b. Activate contracted logistics support. 
c. Coordinate with potentially affected counties regarding specific 
Operational Areas at risk. 
d. If appropriate, activate and deploy REMs and state-level 
Communication Teams to specific Operational Areas or County 
EOCs. 
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2. Phase 2 
a. Deploy state Communication Teams if not previously deployed. 
b. As required, deploy search and rescue teams. 
c. Deploy medical teams as required to Operational Areas. 
d. As required, coordinate response package efforts to assist in 
reopening critical infrastructure within Operational Areas. 
e. Establish communications with affected counties and deploy state 
communication teams as necessary to re-establish communications 
with affected counties and Operational Areas. 
f. Dispatch initial relief shipments in accordance with State Logistics 
Plan.  Confirm locations required for initial relief shipments, types 
and quantities of supplies to transport, and the appropriate modes 
of transportation needed to deliver the assets. 
g. Develop follow-on plans to sustain the Operational Area relief 
effort. 
h. Develop specific infrastructure restoration priorities and 
Operational Area response plans based upon each county’s critical 
infrastructure priority list. 
i. As required, deploy inspection teams and conduct Operational 
Area aerial reconnaissance to assess roads, bridges, and other 
infrastructure damage. 
j. Provide follow on relief supplies based upon detailed initial 
damage assessments conducted by affected county EMDs. 
k. Coordinate the inspection/evaluation of hazardous material release 
and the impact on the public within Operational Areas. 
l. Coordinate preliminary damage assessment of critical 
infrastructure within Operational Areas. 
m. Provide for the public safety and security of citizens. 
n. Provide accurate, consistent, and expedient emergency public 
information to the public. 
C. Recovery 
Conduct on-going, prioritized Operational Area relief and infrastructure 
restoration. 
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D. Mitigation 
1. Support and plan for mitigation measures.  Support requests and directives 
concerning mitigation or re-development. 
2. Document matters that may be needed for inclusion in agency or 
state/federal briefings, situation reports, and action plans. 
V. RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. SC Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) 
1. Conduct/update worst-case loss estimation modeling for all Operational 
Areas by county. 
2. Based on worst-case loss estimates, develop/update initial logistical 
support and infrastructure restoration plans.  In coordination with the 
counties, develop Operational Area specific logistics plans for inclusion in 
the state Logistics Plan. 
3. Based on information provided by the counties, maintain current 
Operational Area infrastructure, population, and logistics distribution site 
data. 
4. Coordinate Operational Area procedures with county Emergency 
Management Directors and other officials as required. 
5. Assist with sourcing, training, and equipping state-level Communication 
Teams. 
6. Assist counties in developing GIS-based, layered Operational Area maps. 
7. Coordinate with counties the development of primary and alternate 
Operational Area entry and exit routes. 
8. Maintain an up-to-date database of county critical infrastructure by 
Operational Area and maintain a GIS library of county Operational Areas, 
i.e., county maps with appropriate layers to describe their Operational 
Areas. 
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B. Emergency Support Functions (ESF) Actions 
1. Develop pre-planned response packages based upon functional areas.  The 
response packages will supplement county capabilities. 
2. Develop plans to support Operational Area development, including 
coordination with the counties to develop primary and alternate 
Operational Area entry and exit routes. 
3. De-conflict with the county EMDs the responsibility (among state, county, 
and municipality agencies) to open and maintain the routes into all 
Operational Areas. 
C. Budget and Control Board, Division of Information Operations (DTO) 
1. Develop/update communications plans specific to Operational Areas for 
inclusion in the state Communications Plan/ architecture, including the 
identification and maintenance of lists of potential communications 
shortfalls by counties. 
2. In coordination with SCEMD, determine the best method for 
communication following disasters. 
3. In coordination with SCEMD, utilize the ECV, IMTs, and REMs 
(personnel and equipment) to support communications needs in the 
affected areas following a disaster. 
4. As needed, provide communications assistance to county emergency 
management offices following a disaster. 
D. Counties 
1. Develop Operational Areas using concepts described in this plan. 
a. Develop county Operational Area infrastructure data, update 
annually, include as GIS layer and provide to SCEMD. 
b. In coordination with ESF 1 (Transportation), develop primary and 
alternate Operational Area entry and exit routes, and include as 
GIS layer. 
2. In coordination with ESF 1 (Transportation), de-conflict responsibility 
(among state, county, and municipality agencies) to clear and maintain 
priority routes into local Operational Areas. 
3. Receive state response packages and relief supplies. 
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4. Equip Unified/Incident Coordinators with all necessary communications 
equipment and transportation. 
5. Dispatch/activate Unified/Incident Coordinators for duty in appropriate 
Operational Areas. 
6. Develop/update communications plans specific to Operational Areas for 
inclusion in the state Communications plan/architecture. 
VI. RESPONSE PACKAGES 
A. The different response packages are listed below. 
B. For each package, there will be three levels: basic, intermediate, and advanced.  
Each level will build on the previous level. 
C. Once each level has been developed, it will be added to this Attachment. 
1. Road clearance and opening 
2. Debris clearing 
3. Utility Restoration  
4. Snow and Ice Clearing 
5. Fire Fighting 
a. Urban 
b. Urban-Wildland Interface Fires 
c. Wildfire 
6. HAZMAT Response 
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11. Search and Rescue 
12. Communications Teams (see Operational Area Communication Plan for 
details of communications teams) 
ANNEX B TO CATESTROPHIC INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. When a catastrophic event occurs, local jurisdictions will likely be overwhelmed 
and require additional resources to manage the incident.  There are regional and 
State based teams and assets available to Emergency Managers and Incident 
Commanders to assist in their response and management of those incidents. 
B. This Annex outlines the procedures to locate, procure and deliver essential 
emergency resources, such as firefighting, Urban Search and Rescue, medical 
support services, disaster relief and personnel, required to support immediate 
response actions. 
C. The utilization of assets within this Annex is scalable and allows for the 
appropriate level of response to achieve the required objectives prior to, during or 
following a county or regional emergency. 
D. This Annex will does not replace or supersede the authorities, policies, plans or 
procedures of any participating jurisdiction, agency, or organization. 
II. PURPOSE 
A. Assist each county or jurisdiction in acquiring the additional regional and 
statewide deployable assets necessary to mitigate, respond and recover from 
catastrophic incidents exceeding the capabilities of the affected county. 
B. Address the shortfalls in capabilities, assets and incident management that may 
exist within counties in dealing with a catastrophic event. 
C. List the assets and capabilities of specialized teams, equipment and personnel 
available to provide a regional or multi-jurisdictional response to a catastrophic 
event. 
D. Promote proactive and expanded coordination between counties Incident 
Commanders and Emergency Managers can access the resources necessary to 
manage any level of incident. 
III. SCOPE 
A. Addresses the roles and responsibilities of federal, State, and local departments 
and agencies, and should be used in conjunction with the National Response 
Framework, the South Carolina Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP) and the 
individual county Emergency Operations Plans (EOP). 
B. Provides assistance and clarification to all local departments and agencies 
involved in Crisis and/or Consequence Management activities. 
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 Crisis Management is the immediate response to a catastrophic man-made 
(e.g., terrorism, WMD, HAZMAT, explosive) or natural event (e.g., 
earthquake, hurricane, flood, or fire). 
 Consequence Management addresses the short and long-term effects of 
those events on people, property and communities. 
IV. ASSUMPTIONS 
A. Counties will need to meet emergency needs internally for up to 72 hours until 
State or federal assistance can be mobilized. 
B. All necessary decisions affecting response, recovery, protective actions, public 
health and safety advisories, etc. will be made by responsible officials under 
existing authorities, policies, plans, and procedures. 
C. A major regional incident, which may cause numerous fatalities and injuries, 
property damage, and disruption of normal life support systems, will have an 
impact on the Region and State’s economic, physical, and social infrastructure. 
D. A large number of casualties, damage to buildings and basic infrastructure, and 
disruption of essential public services will overwhelm the capabilities of 
individual counties to meet the need of the situation. 
E. Establishing common terminology and structuring the plan for compatibility with 
each county, State, and federal emergency plan improves regional 
communications and coordination. 
F. The degree of State and federal involvement will be related to the severity of the 
event and the county’s need for support. 
V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A. General 
1. Multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency, and statewide events will quickly 
require the need for a coordinated response among all agencies and assets 
involved. 
2. Resources committed to disaster response will be under the immediate 
direction of the on-scene command structure which may be led by a single 
agency or a unified command. 
3. Resource management will focus on providing resource support directly to 
emergency response and recovery efforts during the initial response phase 
after a catastrophic incident. 
Catastrophic Incident Response Plan 
SCCIRP 
Appendix 9-B-3 15 April 2015 
4. The Incident Commander is the only authority who may authorize the 
release of any resources.  No resources may leave the incident until 
authorized to do so. 
5. The Incident Commander will determine which surplus equipment and 
personnel will be retained during mobilization based upon the size and 
location of the incident, and safety considerations, 
6. Within the State there are strategically positioned resources and assets, 
such as decontamination units, mobile command post vehicles, SC Law 
Enforcement Division (SLED) and SC Department of Health and 
Environmental Control (SCDHEC) HAZMAT teams, Incident Support 
Teams (IST), mass casualty units, along with other teams, available 
through Mutual Aid Agreements to assist in a catastrophic event. 
B. Coordination 
1. When an incident takes place, the responding county agency/authority will 
review the situation and determine the requirements needed to 
successfully respond to and recover from the event. 
2. If the event is of significant nature as determined by the Incident 
Commander or designated authority and additional assets are deemed 
necessary, he/she should notify the County Emergency Manager/Director 
that additional assets are required. 
3. Most emergencies are handled by individual counties using standard 
operational guidelines or procedures.  When the capabilities of a county 
are exceeded, adjacent counties may be engaged by the county EM/EOC 
through mutual aid agreements. 
4. As the catastrophic incident begins to have a regional impact, regional 
assets identified in this Catastrophic Resource Guide may be called on for 
support within the authority of the Firefighter Mobilization Act and State 
Wide Mutual Aid Agreements.  The State and federal government may be 
called to provide supplemental assistance as dictated by the changing 
nature of the incident. 
5. Emergency Managers should notify the SCEMD as soon as possible of the 
incident and of any resources they have requested. 
6. The State Warning Point (SWP) will use the procedures outlined in the 
SWP SOP to forward or respond to requests for State-level resources. 
7. SCEMD is the primary agency for coordination of requests for assistance 
and assets beyond the capabilities of the counties in the State.  The 
SCEOP defines the process if the incident requires response that cannot be 
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met at the State-level.  EMAC can be activated to provide assistance from 
other states. 
8. Incidents may be so catastrophic, or in the case of terrorist or WMD 
events, that a federal response may be required to respond and recover 
from such incidents. 
VI. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
A. Unique resources are available to the State and local jurisdictions through federal 
authorities such as the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), which is a national 
asset providing delivery of antibiotics, antidotes and medical supplies to the scene 
of a natural or man-made incident. 
B. Logistical support is available to the counties to support Points of Distribution 
(POD).  Refer to the Attachment A (South Carolina State Logistics Plan) to the 
SCEOP for the process of distribution and list of assets. 
C. The local County Emergency Manager/EOC will be the Point of Contact (POC) to 
provide additional resources to the Incident Commander. 
D. Regional/State-wide Teams 
1. Tab 1 and 2 identifies regionally based or State teams or assets available 
for response. 
2. Impacted counties should contact those teams directly which are based 
within their region. 
3. If a regional team/asset is utilized, the local Emergency Manager will 
notify SCEMD as soon as possible.  If the regionally based team is 
unavailable, the local Emergency Manager should make additional support 
requests to SCEMD. 
a. If the SEOC is not currently activated, the requesting counties 
should contact the SWP to coordinate for the additional resources 
b. If the SEOC is activated, the request should be made directly to the 
SEOC via WebEOC or phone. 
4. Upon a request for additional support, the SEOC/SWP will contact the 
Emergency Manager of the team/resource’s host county.  The local 
Emergency Manager will contact the POC of the team/resource 
activated/deployed to support the incident. 
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VII. ATTACHMENTS 
Tab 1  State Teams 
Tab 2   Regional and Statewide Medical Assets 
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SC Task Force 1 (TF-1) 
SCNG - 43rd Civil Support Team 
(CST) 
SLED WMD Response Team 
Primary 
Mission 
Fire and Rescue Response Urban Search and Rescue WMD Response WMD Tactical Response 
Capabilities 
 Firefighting Rescue personnel and 
equipment 
 HAZMAT response 
 US&R, water and technical rescue 
 Location and extraction of victims 
of structural collapse 
 K-9 search teams 
 Structural integrity assessments 
incident management support 
WMD HAZMAT response including 
identification and command support 
 HAZMAT, EOD, SWAT, crime 
scene analysis and Incident 
Command 
 Equipment includes robotics, 
armored vehicles, helicopters 
Deployment 
Time 
1-3 hours based on incident location 
 2 hours for incident support team 
 4-6 hours for full team support 
based on incident location 
 2-3 hours based on incident location 
 Operational within 90 minutes of 
arrival 
 1-3 hours based on incident location 




 Overnight shelter 
 Latrine facilities 
 ½ acre for operations base 
 ATV forklift is requested 
 Water supply for Decon  
 Space for 8 vehicles and 3 large 
trailers 
 Fire and medical support 
 Water supply for Decon, assembly 
area and rest areas 
Team 
Strength 
3,700 registered firefighters on 
volunteer call up 
Rotating 70 person teams including 
search and rescue, technical support 
and command elements 
 22 highly trained military personnel 
 8 vehicles 
 3 trailers 
 Mobile lab 
 Command post vehicle with 
communications 
36 SLED agents 
Team 
Location 
 Based in Columbia 
 Coordinators throughout State 
Columbia Columbia Columbia 
Activation 
Notes 
Self-sufficient with exception of 
housing and shelter 
 Self-sufficient for 72 hours 
 Operational for 10 days before 
requiring resupply 
 Self-sufficient for 72 hours 
 Second CST needed for responses 
lasting beyond 48 hours 
 Coordinates response with DHEC 
 Teams tactical EMT responds for 




 Regional team $15k per operational 
period 
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 DHEC WMD Response Team 
Incident Management Teams 
(IMT) 
(State Type II Team) 
Incident Management Teams 
(IMT) 
(State Type III Team) 





WMD HAZMAT responses support 
for SLED WMD Team 
Incident Management  
Support 
Incident Management  
Support 
Communications voice, data & radio 
Capabilities 
 Technical expertise on chemical, 
radiological and biological agents 
 Field identification of unknown 
substances 
Incident Command support for:  
 Natural Disasters 
 Terrorist incidents 
 Train Derailments 
 Aircraft incidents 
 Public or civil unrest 
 Large public events 
Incident Command support for:  
 Natural Disasters 
 Terrorist incidents 
 Train Derailments 
 Aircraft incidents 
 Public or civil unrest 
 Large public events 
 Provide emergency backup and 
communication resources  
 Deployable satellite phone/internet 
UHF, VHF and 800 MHz radios, 
repeaters, radio cache, satellite 
phones, portable towers 
Deployment 
time 
2-4 hours based on incident location 
(statewide) 
8 hours plus travel time 2 hours plus travel time 1 hour (+) travel time 
Team 
Requirements 
 Water supply for Decon 
 Space for 5-6 large vehicles 
 EMS support 
Accommodations for up to 14 days Accommodations for up to 7 days None 
Team 
Strength 
5 members per team 20-25 members 10-20 members 3-8 members 
Team 
Location 
12 district areas located throughout 
the State  
Statewide 
Team Headquarters locations: 
 Aiken County 
 Anderson County 
 Florence County 
 Dorchester County 
 Primary assets located in Columbia 
 Support team members located 
around the state 
Activation 
Notes 
Functional for 10-12 hours per 
shift/team 
Contact State Warning Point 
Contact Team Host, County EOC or 




 Feeding, housing & fuel Feeding, housing & fuel N/A 
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County Animal Response Team 
(CART) 
Red Cross  
(ARC) 
The Salvation Army  
(TSA) 
Logistics Support Team (LST) 
Primary 
Mission 
Agro terrorism mitigation and animal 
response  
Disaster relief Disaster relief 
Provide support and support to first 
responders 
Capabilities 
 Emergency animal disease response 
(under authority of State 
Veterinarian)  
 Support for issues involving 
animals and agriculture at county 
and regional levels  
 Shelter 
 Food 
 Health and mental health services 
 Emergency worker feeding 
 Blood supplies 
Assist in feeding, sheltering and 
recovery for victims 
 Assist in the sheltering (cool/heat) 
and hygiene needs of first 
responders 
 Sleep 60 
 Communication capabilities 
Deployment 
time 
N/A 1-4 hours 1-4 hours 12-24 hours 
Team 
Requirements 
N/A N/A N/A 
 ½ acre for setup 
 Water access  
Team 
Strength 
Varies Varies as required by incident Varies as required  by incident Up to 6 personnel 
Team 
Location 
 Various counties 
 6 counties have trucks and animal 
capture panels:  
 Aiken County 
 Horry County 
 Anderson County 
 Richland County 
 Sumter County 
 Charleston County 
Regional Chapters County offices Beaufort County 
Activation 
Notes 
 Activated as needed by county 
EMD Directors  
  Dependent on host for meals 
Cost to 
Counties 
 N/A N/A 
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Tab 2 
Regional and Statewide Medical Assets 
 
Regional Medical Assistance 
Teams (RMAT) 
DHEC Mobile Medical 
Facility 
Metropolitan Medical Response 
System (MMRS) 
SC Helicopter Aquatic Rescue 
Team (SC HART) 
Primary Mission 
Mobile mass treatment, personnel 
and facility for WMD/natural 
disasters  
Provide facilities for treatment and 
triage during medical surge or 
catastrophic operations 
Enhance medical capability to 
respond to a mass casualty event 
Extracting patens form remote and 
dangerous location 
Capabilities 
 Mobile medical facility  
 Augment local medical 
infrastructure  
 Expand hospital capacity 
 Mobile triage facility 
 Capacity for 34-50 casualties 
 Mass casualty sheltering 
 Mass prophylaxis 
 Support DHEC medical facility 
 POD support 
 CBRN 
 Pharmaceuticals 
 Medical disaster management 
 DECON support facility 
 Helicopters (UH-60) 
 Aerial extraction 
 Swift water extraction 
 Medical support 
 3 active helicopters 
 Can support up to 5 air teams 
 8 Swift Water Rescue boat teams  
Deployment Time 
 Forward deployment within 12 
hours  
 Remainder within 24-36 hours  
12 hours or less for complete 
operational capability 
1 hour + travel time 
 45 minutes + travel (weekdays) 





 5 acres for set up  
 Water supply and diesel fuel for 
sustained operations  
 ½ acre for setup 
 Water access for sustained 
operations 
N/A 
 Minimum Landing zone - 100 ft 
X 100 ft 
 Food and rations for extended 
operation day 
Team Strength 
24-45 personnel dependent upon 
mission  
N/A N/A 
 18 rescue swimmers 
 12 (+) aircrew  
Team Location 
 Lexington County 
 Horry County 
 Beaufort County 
 Spartanburg County 
 Throughout State 
 Minimum 1 in each DHEC region 
Primary assets are located in 
Columbia 
Primary assets are located in 
Columbia 
Activation Notes 
 Call to State Warning Point who 
will then notify State RMAT POC 
 State RMAT POS will notify 
specific region  
 Trailers require heavy duty 
towing capability. 
 6 personnel required for setup 
 Trailers require heavy duty vehicle 
towing capability 
 Will need logistics support as 
trailers are likely to have drivers 
only 
Call to State Warning Point or Dan 
McManus with as much specifics 
as available  
Cost to Counties Fuel and food   
To be determined (est.$5,900 per 
hour) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The State’s communication system is comprised of personnel, facilities, 
equipment, and procedures necessary to effectively link various facilities within 
the overall statewide emergency management systems. 
B. The communication systems used to link these facilities will consist of radio and 
telephone systems in current use, additional equipment brought in to supplement 
existing capabilities, and additional communication support provided by radio 
amateur services. 
C. A catastrophic disaster such as an earthquake, a hurricane, or Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) event may cause most communication systems in the State to 
be inoperable.  A catastrophic disaster will disrupt commercial communication 
services to and within the impacted areas. 
D. The use of normal communication systems should be attempted, but in a 
catastrophic situation, satellite radio and satellite telephone may be required to 
provide the initial means of communication from the State Emergency Operations 
Center (SEOC) to local emergency management offices and other critical 
facilities. 
E. Other communication support services will become available as resources and 
conditions permit. 
II. PURPOSE 
A. Ensure coordinated communication operations in the Operational Areas following 
a disaster. 
B. Deploy trained communication teams to Operational Areas to implement a rapid 
emergency communication system to support State and local governments in 
response to a catastrophic event. 
III. ORGANIZATION 
The following agencies and/or organization’s participation in this plan may consist of 
personnel, radio system equipment, or facilities: 
 SC National Guard (SCNG) 
 SC Budget and Control Board, Division of Technology Operations (DTO) 
 Mobile Communication Systems 
 SC Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) 
 SC Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES) 
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 SC Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES) 
 SC Forestry Commission (SCFC) 
 SC State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) 
 SC Department of Natural Resources (SCDNR) 
 SC Department of Public Safety (SCDPS) 
 SC Department of Transportation (SCDOT) 
 SC Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (SCPPP) 
 SC Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism (SCPRT) 
 SC Department of Commerce, Division of Aeronautics (SCDOC/SCDAO) 
 Civil Air Patrol (CAP) 
 Private Sector Support 
IV. ASSUMPTIONS 
A. Commercial and government land-lined wire, microwave, and radio 
communication will likely be damaged and overloaded in the Operational Areas 
due to a catastrophic disaster. 
B. Commercial communication capabilities in non-impacted areas of South Carolina 
may be diminished due to system overload. 
C. Existing state assets will not be sufficient to support all the communication 
systems following a disaster.  Coordination with federal counterparts and other 
states to obtain resources may be a priority. 
V. SITUATION 
A. The priority of the communications teams is to establish communications from 
the Operational Areas to the SEOC. 
B. SCEMD utilizes the Operational Area concept to enhance county and State-level 
planning and response to natural and man-made disasters, and other significant 
events. 
VI. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A. ESF-2 (Communications) is the lead ESF for coordinating this plan. 
B. Each county is responsible for providing for its own communication.  When the 
requirements of the situation exceed the county’s internal capabilities, the 
counties will requests assistance from the State. 
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C. The priority mode of communication is satellite telephone, followed by radio 
systems, and lastly cellular communications.  The mode of communications will 
be determined by needs assessment conducted by deployed teams and DTO. 
D. Trained communicators and operators from state agencies and organizations, 
while under direct control of their own agency or volunteer entities and operating 
their equipment will do the following: 
 Be subject to the guidance of SEOC and County EOC for effective 
coordinated emergency communication. 
 Adhere to established procedures as outlined in the SC Emergency 
Operations Plan (SCEOP). 
 Adhere to procedures set forth in this plan. 
 Participate in training and exercises. 
E. State-level Support 
1. The State-level support will consist of deploying communication teams 
and equipment to support communications in the Operational Areas. 
2. The teams will have a capability for long distance point-to-point 
communications from designated location(s) to the SEOC. 
3. There are three response levels: Level A, B, and C. The three response 
levels will ensure a redundant communication operation will occur. 
a. Level A 
(1) The Level A response represents the State’s most rapid 
response capability. 
(2) A-Teams will deploy within 4 hours of notification and on-
scene within 12 hours. 
(3) A-Teams will operate 24-hours, and maximum operational 
period is 3 days only. 
b. Level B 
(1) The Level B response will consist of B-Team members. 
(2) B-Teams will deploy is within 24-48 hours or less after 
notification. 
(3) B-Teams may or may not be co-located with A-Teams, but 
could relay information to A-Teams if necessary.  B-Teams 
must maintain the capability to communicate outside the 
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Operational Area should the Level A capability be 
diminished. 
(4) B-Teams will have the capability to operate 24 hours/day, 
and for operational periods longer than three (3) days. 
c. Level C 
(1) The Level C response will consist of the Civil Support 
Team (CST) and Joint Incident Site Communications 
Capability (JISCC) from the SCNG. 
(2) Deployment is within 48-72 hours after notification. 
(3) C-Teams have the capabilities to support an operation 
longer than 5 days as required by SERT. 
(4) The teams maintain the capability to communicate outside 
of the Operational Area should the Level A or B capability 
be diminished. 
4. Based upon the communication needs assessment, SCEMD director will 




a. The communication teams will be deployed to the impacted area.  
Each team will have two (2) members from the SCEMD Regional 
Emergency Managers (REM) and two (2) members of State 
Operational Area Liaison Team (SOALT) for a total of four (4) 
persons.  Personnel from the CST and the SC Air National Guard 
(SCANG) may also be available to deploy with the A-Teams. 
b. If necessary, A-Teams may splint into 12 Teams consisting of two 
(2) members - one (1) REM and one (1) SOALT. 
c. The REM of the A-Team is the team leader and will report to the 
SCEMD Coordinator. 
d. The teams will report to the County EOC or other locations as 
tasked to provide communications from county Operational 
Area(s) or EOC to SEOC following an earthquake. 
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2. B-Teams 
a. The second tier of communications support with activation and 
deployment 24 hours after notification are the B-Teams consisting 
of SCNG Tactical Satellite (SCTAC) members and, if available, 
volunteers (RACES). 
b. The senior person of the B Team is the team leader. 
c. If necessary, Level B-Teams may be supported by EMAC. 
3. C-Teams 
a. The C-Team composition is comprised of personnel from CST and 
JISCC from the SCNG. 
b. The senior person of the C-Team is the team leader. 
4. SOALT 
a. SOALT liaison team will serve as communication operators for 
SERT operations and work in two shifts. 
b. SOALT personnel in the State Warning Point (SWP) will receive 
Field reports using the message forms provided and deliver these 
reports to SEOC Operations. 
c. SEOC Operations will analyzed and record the information in 
WebEOC. 
G. Activation 
1. Once the SEOC issues the order to implement the Operational Area 
Communications Plan, The SEOC will utilize emergency notifications 
systems to notify A-Team leaders and members.  The A-Team leader will 
contact members to confirm available status for deployment. 
2. Upon A-Team activation, Chief of Operations will assign a 
Communications Team Coordinator (either from SCEMD or DTO) who is 
responsible for ensuring the following information is provided to the 
Operations Chief: 
 Estimated time until full mobilization is complete and the team is 
ready for deployment. 
 Any equipment or teams not available for deployment. 
 Any equipment or teams whose departure will be delayed. 
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3. If team leaders and members are unable to be contacted, the available 
members will self-deploy to the departure location (SCEMD) and contact 
SCEMD Operations through the SWP. 
4. Upon notification, the team leaders of B-Teams will contact the B-Team 
members to determine available status.  The team leaders will provide 
status of available members to ESF-2 (Communications). 
5. The SCEMD Operations Chief will determine the need to alert and 
activate the C-Teams. 
H. Transportation 
1. ESF-2 (Communications) will coordinate transportation for the teams with 
ESF-1 (Transportation). 
2. If teams are transported by air, an aerial reconnaissance will be conducted 
before landing to obtain general information on damages. 
I. Deployment 
1. Departure Locations 
a. Primary 
(1) SCEMD parking lot (Pine Ridge Armory) - 33°54’63”N-
81°06’05”W. 
(2) This area will accommodate two (2) UH-60 Black Hawk 
helicopters landing in trail.  Utilization of this airspace will 
require prior coordination with the Columbia Metropolitan 
Airport traffic control tower. 
(3) SCEMD personnel will conduct a Foreign Object or Debris 
(FOD) walkthrough of the designated landing area before 
landing. 
b. 1st Alternate.  SC Division of Aeronautics hanger located at 2553 
Airport Boulevard, West Columbia, SC. 
c. 2ndAlternate.  Eagle Aviation Terminal located at Columbia 
Metropolitan Airport in Columbia, South Carolina.   
2. At the departure location, team members will receive a situation briefing, 
deployment, and safety briefing by the SEOC Communications Team 
Coordinator, pick-up equipment and care packages, and conduct 
equipment readiness check. 
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3. The SEOC Communications Team Coordinator will notify SEOC of 
Teams’ actual departure time from departure location. 
J. Operations 
1. After deployment, the Teams actions are coordinated by SCEMD and 
ESF-2 (Communications).  SCEMD Operations will assign a 
Communications Team Coordinator to serve as the POC for the deployed 
teams, and handle implementation actions as requested by SEOC 
Operations 
2. State emergency communications support and assistance will be provided 
as quickly and as efficiently as feasible.  ESF-2 (Communications) will 
attempt to contact the counties to determine communications needs; 
however, this will not restrain SERT from deploying teams based on 
planning assumptions.   
3. Upon arrival, the team leader will report to the county director or designee 
to determine locations of needed communication support. 
4. Needs Assessment 
a. ESF-2 (Communications) and the deployed team will conduct a 
needs assessment to identify the most probable method at the time 
of the event to communicate, i.e., satellite telephone and/or radio, 
commercial telephone systems, etc. 
b. The timely reporting of the information will assist in prioritizing 
communication support, requirements, and making 
recommendations to deploy equipment and personnel to 
Operational Areas as required. 
5. Assignment priorities should be given to the following: 
 EOC and/or Alternate EOC (AEOC) 
 Critical facilities – Critical facilities locations such as public safety 
facilities and medical centers which are vital to maintain 
population survival and community stability 
 Transportation Entry/Re-Entry Points - Pre-identified locations in 
an Operational Area where resources (equipment, supplies, 
personnel, etc.) will be received and later deployed within the area.  
The transportation entry/re-entry points could be roadways, 
waterways, airports, and heliports within the operational area.  
These points of entry are situation dependent and could change due 
to the severity of the event. 
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 Incident Command Posts (ICP), State Logistics Support Areas 
(LSA), Staging Areas (SA), and county Points of Distribution 
(POD). 
K. Reporting 
1. The deployed teams will report information to the SEOC as necessary. 
2. The Team Leader will coordinate with the County Director or designee on 
the type of intelligence to report.  Lifesaving reporting requirements 
should be the priority. 
3. The type of intelligence to report should include, but not be limited to: 
 Locations of collapsed structures for search and rescue. 
 Status of communication systems to include broadcast media. 
 Locations of critical need, i.e., food, water, medical. 
 Locations of out-of-control fires. 
 Locations of hazardous material releases. 
 Public safety needs, i.e., security, traffic control, law enforcement. 
 The general condition of transportation infrastructures (damaged or 
no damage). 
 The general condition of lifelines and critical facilities (damaged 
or no damage). 
 Locations of facilities or open spaces that could serve as landing 
zones and medical triage. 
L. Logistics 
1. SCEMD will provide the 4-man A-Teams with two (2) Iridium SAT 
Telephones, two (2) SAT Transportable radios/telephone, two (2) 800 
MHz Portables, and two (2) cell phones along w/applicable battery 
packages.  The REMs assigned equipment will be used as back up. 
2. SCEMD will provide the 2-man A-Teams with one (1) Iridium SAT 
Telephones, one (1) SAT Transportable radios/telephone, one (1) 800 
MHz Portable, and one (1) cell phone along with applicable battery 
packages.  The REMs assigned equipment will be used as back up. 
3. Members are capable of self-sustainment for at least 72 hours after 
deployment to the incident site. 
4. SEOC will supplement food and/or supplies after three (3) days. 
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5. Team members should be prepared to stay up to six (6) days at the 
assignment location. 
6. Rotation assignments will be coordinated at SEOC by ESF-2 
(Communications) through SCEMD Operations. 
VII. RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. General 
1. All supporting agencies will participate in an annual review of the 
Operational Area Communications Plan. 
2. All supporting agencies will participate in training and exercises as 
required by this plan. 
B. South Carolina National Guard 
1. As required by DTO, assign personnel to serve on Communication C-
teams. 
2. Appoint C-Team leaders. 
3. Maintain rosters of team leaders and members, and update as necessary. 
4. Identify communication equipment, systems and services available to 
support teams and provide to DTO. 
5. Ensure personnel are capable to serve on a 24-hour basis and six days 
rotation. 
C. SC Budget and Control Board, Division of Technology Operations 
1. In coordination with SCEMD, conduct annual review of the Operational 
Area Communications Plan with supporting agencies. 
2. In coordination with SCEMD, identify a communications coordinator 
from ESF-2 (Communications) to serve as SEOC Communications Team 
Coordinator for deployed teams. 
3. Coordinate with ESF-6 (Mass Care) to provide care packages to support 
team members.  This care package will consist of MREs, water, blankets, 
and personal supplies 
4. In coordination with SCEMD, ensure SOPs are developed and maintained 
for addressing training, team activation and deployment, equipment 
maintenance and readiness, forms, team safety, care packages, and team 
training and exercises. 
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5. Develop a system to evaluate communication resources pre-and post-
event. 
6. In coordination with SCEMD, annually update names and telephone 
numbers of A and B-Team members in the CODE RED notification 
system. 
7. In coordination with SCEMD, ensure B and C Teams are capable to serve 
on a 24-hour basis and six (6) days rotation; the A-Teams maximum 
operational period is three (3) days. 
8. Identify communication channels required to meet the anticipated 
operational loads of supporting communication teams. 
9. Review and update the resource data on communication systems, 
frequencies, and standard operating procedures for communication 
systems. 
10. In coordination with SCEMD, annually request supporting agencies to 
provide types of communication systems and services available to support 
communication teams.  Maintain list and update as necessary. 
11. In coordination with SCEMD, prepare and conduct team training and 
exercise annually. 
12. In coordination with SCEMD, coordinate with supporting agencies to 
provide needed resources in support of the communication teams as the 
need arises. 
D. SC Budget and Control Board, SC Aeronautics Commission 
1. Ensure an assembly and departure area is available upon request. 
2. Be prepared to assist with any technical issue that may arise during 
departure operation. 
E. SC Emergency Management Division 
1. In coordination with DTO, identify a communications coordinator from 
SCEMD that could serve as SEOC Communications Team Coordinator 
for deployed teams. 
2. In coordination with DTO, ensure SOPs are developed and maintained for 
addressing training, team activation and deployment, equipment 
maintenance and readiness, forms, team safety, care packages, and team 
training and exercises. 
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3. In coordination with DTO, annually update names and telephone numbers 
of A and B-Team members in the CODE RED notification system. 
4. In coordination with DTO, ensure B and C Teams are capable to serve on 
a 24-hour basis and six (6) days rotation; the A-Teams maximum 
operational period is three (3) days. 
5. In coordination with SOALT members, appoint personnel to serve as 
communication operators in SEOC communication cell.  This will include 
providing annual training to communication operators. 
6. In coordination with DTO, annually request supporting agencies to 
provide types of communication systems and services available to support 
communication teams.  Maintain list and update as necessary. 
7. In coordination with DTO, prepare and conduct team training and exercise 
annually.  
8. In coordination with DTO, coordinate with supporting agencies to provide 
needed resources in support of the communication teams as the need 
arises. 
9. Assign REMs and Coordinators to serve on Operational Area 
Communication A-Teams. 
10. Provide for communication space for communication operators. 
11. Annually identify SOALT members who will support the Operational 
Area Communications A-Team. 
12. Be prepared to incorporate communications reports into the State’s 
Situation Report. 
F. SC Forestry Commission 
1. As available, assign personnel to serve on A-Teams for Level A response 
(assigned personnel for SOALT member is sufficient). 
2. Provide members contact information to SCEMD to add to the CODE 
RED notification system to alert, mobilize, and deploy. 
3. Identify communication equipment, systems, and services available to 
support teams and provide to DTO. 
4. Ensure personnel are capable to serve on a 24-hour basis and three (3) 
days rotation. 
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G. State Law Enforcement Division 
1. As available, assign personnel to serve on A-Teams for Level A response 
(assigned personnel for SOALT member is sufficient). 
2. Provide members contact information to SCEMD to add to the CODE 
RED notification system to alert, mobilize, and deploy. 
3. Identify communication equipment, systems, and services available to 
support teams and provide to DTO. 
4. Ensure personnel are capable to serve on a 24-hour basis and three (3) 
days rotation. 
H. SC Department of Natural Resources 
1. As available, assign personnel to serve on A-Teams for Level A response 
(assigned personnel for SOALT member is sufficient). 
2. Provide members contact information to SCEMD to add to the CODE 
RED notification system to alert, mobilize, and deploy. 
3. Identify communication equipment, systems, and services available to 
support teams and provide to DTO. 
4. Ensure personnel are capable to serve on a 24-hour basis and three days 
rotation. 
I. SC Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism 
1. As available, assign personnel to serve on A-Teams for Level A response 
(assigned personnel for SOALT member is sufficient). 
2. Provide members contact information to SCEMD to add to the CODE 
RED notification system to alert, mobilize, and deploy. 
3. Identify communication equipment, systems, and services available to 
support teams and provide to DTO. 
4. Ensure personnel are capable to serve on a 24-hour basis and three (3) 
days rotation. 
J. SC Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services 
1. As available, assign personnel to serve on A-Teams for Level A response 
(assigned personnel for SOALT member is sufficient). 
2. Provide members contact information to SCEMD to add to the CODE 
RED notification system to alert, mobilize, and deploy. 
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3. Identify communication equipment, systems, and services available to 
support teams and provide to DTO. 
4. Ensure personnel are capable to serve on a 24-hour basis and three (3) 
days rotation. 
K. SC Department of Public Safety 
1. As available, assign personnel to serve on A-Teams for Level A response 
(assigned personnel for SOALT member is sufficient). 
2. Provide members contact information to SCEMD to add to the CODE 
RED notification system to alert, mobilize, and deploy. 
3. Identify communication equipment, systems, and services available to 
support teams and provide to DTO. 
4. Ensure personnel are capable to serve on a 24-hour basis and three (3) 
days rotation. 
L. SC Department of Transportation 
1. As available, assign personnel to serve on A-Teams for Level A response 
(assigned personnel for SOALT member is sufficient). 
2. Provide members contact information to SCEMD to add to the CODE 
RED notification system to alert, mobilize, and deploy. 
3. Identify communication equipment, systems, and services available to 
support teams and provide to DTO. 
4. Ensure personnel are capable to serve on a 24-hour basis and three (3) 
days rotation. 
M. SC Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services 
1. Identify members to serve on Level B-Teams including within each 
county Operational Area. 
2. Appoint Team Leaders. 
3. Provide members contact information to SCEMD to add to the CODE 
RED notification system to alert, mobilize, and deploy. 
4. Identify communication equipment, systems, and services available to 
support teams and provide to DTO. 
5. Ensure personnel are capable to serve on a 24-hour basis and three (3) 
days rotation. 
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N. SC Civil Air Patrol 
1. Identify members to serve as B-Teams. 
2. Appoint team leaders. 
3. Maintain rosters of team leaders and members and update as necessary. 
4. Provide team leader and members contact information to SCEMD to add 
to the CODE RED notification system for alerting, mobilizing, and 
deploying if necessary. 
5. Identify communication systems and services available to support teams. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Federal Interagency Community developed the following 15 National Incident 
Scenarios for use as a tool to facilitate preparedness planning: 
1. Nuclear Detonation - 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device 
2. Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax 
3. Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza 
4. Biological Attack - Plague 
5. Chemical Attack - Blister Agent 
6. Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
7. Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent 
8. Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion 
9. Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake 
10. Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane 
11. Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Device 
12. Explosives Attack - Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Devices 
13. Biological Attack - Food contamination 
14. Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease (Foot-and-Mouth Disease) 
15. Cyber Attack 
B. These scenarios were meant to be utilized in Federal, State and local homeland 
security exercises and activities. 
II. PURPOSE 
Provide guidance for State, local emergency management personnel and the responding 
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) in response to scenario specific situations using the 
15 National Incident Scenarios as a baseline. 
III. ASSUMPTIONS 
A. The citizens and property in South Carolina are at possible risk to catastrophic 
natural hazards terrorist threats and attacks. 
Catastrophic Incident Response Plan 
SCCIRP 
Appendix 9-D-2 15 April 2015 
B. A catastrophic incident may occur with little or no advanced warning at any time 
of day or at any place. 
C. The nature and scope of event events will require significant state and federal 
government support after an incident. 
D. The initial effects of a terrorist attack may appear to be “normal” emergencies 
involving agents that affect mass populations. 
E. Local emergency services will be the first units to respond to a natural hazard or 
terrorist incident. 
F. Catastrophic incidents will overwhelm local, county, and state resources. 
IV. SITUATION 
A. The South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) used each of the 
15 National Incident Scenarios to analyze and develop the worst case and most 
likely hazards for the State of South Carolina. 
B. SCEMD adapted the 15 National Incident Scenarios to be applicable to South 
Carolina’s specific population figures and risk of vulnerability. 
C. This Annex does not include Scenarios 3, 9 and 10 because the SCEOP contains 
detailed, comprehensive plans to address Pandemic Influenza (see Annex 2 
(Pandemic Influenza) to Annex 5 (Mass Casualty)), Hurricanes (see Annex 1 (SC 
Hurricane Plan)) and Earthquakes (see Annex 3 (SC Earthquake Plan)). 
D. SCEMD analyzed each of the National Incident Scenarios and the State’s response 
to them.  SCEMD used several factors in the analysis of the location of each 
scenario. 
E. The severity of the situation and the State’s ability to manage the response is 
addressed in each scenario. 
F. The resources available within South Carolina to aid in the response effort were 
cataloged and accounted for in each scenario, thus giving the State a concept of 
which entities will play a role in the response, the number and type of resources 
that will be needed from outside entities, and how these resources will be allotted 
for each scenario. 
G. SCEMD used this assessment to develop plans to address the impacts each 
scenario would have on the State and its response to the event. 
H. All response plans were written based on the worst case/most likely scenarios for 
the State of South Carolina.  The number of people expected to attend an event or 
work/live in vulnerable locations was taken into consideration for each scenario. 
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I. These plans are still in development and additional scenario specific response 
protocols and responsibilities will be published as they are developed. 
V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A. These plans address the response capabilities and the resources the State of South 
Carolina may utilize were an event(s) or attack(s) of catastrophic proportions to 
take place in the State. 
B. If a catastrophic event occurs in the State, the county or counties in which the 
incident occurs will activate their operational areas and their county Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC). 
C. Each scenario response is designed to be a separate plan, but the State’s response 
and resources committed to each scenario will be similar for each event.  The 
Concepts of Operations outlined in the South Carolina Emergency Response Plan 
(SCEOP) and the Catastrophic Incident Response Plan will apply to each scenario.  
D. The State’s response will be: 
1. Activate the SCEOP and the Catastrophic Incident Response Plan. 
2. Activate the State Emergency Operation Center (SEOC), but the level of 
Operational Conditions (OPCON) may vary based on the impact of the 
incident. 
3. Conduct coordination between the affected county/counties and the State. 
4. Notify FEMA Region IV. 
5. Make a recommendation to the Governor in reference to declaration of a 
State of Emergency. 
6. Activate appropriate Emergency Support Functions (ESF). 
7. Implement EMAC (Emergency Management Assistance Compact) 
agreements if necessary. 
VI. ATTACHMENTS 
Tab 1 Nuclear Detonation - 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device 
Tab 2 Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax 
Tab 3 Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza – Omitted (see Annex 2 
(Pandemic Influenza) to Annex 5 (Mass Casualty) to the SCEOP) 
Tab 4 Biological Attack - Plague 
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Tab 5 Chemical Attack - Blister Agent 
Tab 6 Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
Tab 7 Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent 
Tab 8 Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion 
Tab 9 Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake – Omitted (see Appendix 3 (SC 
Earthquake Plan) to the SCEOP) 
Tab 10 Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane – Omitted (see Appendix 1 (SC 
Hurricane Plan) to the SCEOP) 
Tab 11 Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Device 
Tab 12 Explosives Attack - Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Devices 
Tab 13 Biological Attack - Food Contamination 
Tab 14 Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease (Foot-and-Mouth Disease) 
Tab 15 Cyber Attack 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: These estimates are based on large urban exposure 
Casualties 111,967 fatalities 
Infrastructure Damage Massive damage in a 1-3 mile area 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons 
Will vary widely. 
Many citizens impacted by the initial 
exposure to radiation will shelter-in place 
and/or may be contained in the area to 
prevent contamination of other areas. 
Contamination Long-term within 30-50 miles  
Economic Impact Hundreds of millions of dollars 
Potential for Multiple Events No 
Recovery Timeline  Years, in some areas potentially never 
I. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. A 10 kiloton Uranium Improvised Nuclear Device is hidden by a terrorist 
group in a standard shipping container and shipped to Charleston, one of 
the largest ports on the East Coast. 
2. Upon detonation, the explosion will destroy much of the port 
infrastructure and cause massive damage within a three-mile area. 
3. Immediately following detonation, immediate radiation, thermal radiation 
and radiation fallout will be factors.  If the resulting mushroom cloud 
moves to the west, long-term contamination within 30-50 miles may 
occur.  Approximately 100,000 of the population will be killed in the 
initial blast. 
4. Bridges that serve as a primary part of evacuation routes for the coastal 
area may be impacted causing delays and increasing the exposure to 
radiation of evacuees. 
5. Citizens who have received substantial exposure to radiation and burns 
will in all likelihood Shelter-in-Place. 
B. Event Dynamics 
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1. Response to the detonation will be immediate and by survivors in the 
immediate areas.  Over time, hours to days, additional response will be 
forthcoming.  Within hours, an initial perimeter will established and initial 
control of movement into and out of the impact area will begin. 
2. Secondary Hazards/Events 
a. The detonation will have many secondary hazards.  The intense 
heat of the nuclear explosion will cause numerous fires.  Damaged 
buildings, downed power lines, leaking gas lines, broken water 
mains, and other damaged infrastructure will need to be addressed. 
b. Another secondary effect of a nuclear explosion is the 
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP).  This sharp, high voltage spike will 
disrupt communication networks and other electronic equipment 
within an approximate 3 mile range. 
II. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. There will be casualties associated with the initial blast.  Approximately one-third 
of the impacted population will die as a result of the ensuing winds which will be 
in excess of 600 mph and heat in excess of 7,000 degree Fahrenheit.  Radiation 
will result as a by-product of the explosion. 
B. The most dangerous radiation will be deposited within minutes to a few hours 
near the detonation site.  Radioactive fallout will decay with time but will expose 
many people to lethal doses with death ensuing in days to months. 
C. Further from the point of detonation (at around the 12-mile point), injuries from 
acute radiation will decrease.  At distances in excess of 150 miles, acute health 
issues are minimized. 
D. Infrastructure in the blast zone will be severely damaged by wind and fire, will be 
contaminated by radiation, and will have to be destroyed.  The process will take 
many years and could potentially cost billions of dollars. 
III. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Initial Emergency Assessment 
1. The nature of the device will be apparent.  A dead zone perimeter will be 
established and HAZMAT teams with decontamination equipment will be 
sent into the impacted areas. 
2. These teams will report damage estimates and other general intelligence.  
Teams will be limited in the time they can remain in the area and 
resources will quickly become overwhelmed. 
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3. There will be a shortage of HAZMAT teams and decontamination 
equipment. 
4. Citizens attempting to the leave the impacted area will be triaged and 
referred for medical care and decontamination.  Contamination of people 
and the environment will be the primary and compelling concern. 
B. Emergency Management/Response 
1. Communication with the citizenry will be critical and difficult initially due 
to the limited intelligence and the destruction and/or inoperability of 
traditional communication means. 
2. Evacuation and/or shelter-in-place decisions must be made immediately. 
3. Location and removal of injured and disabled citizens will be a significant 
undertaking. 
4. Workers participating in this search and rescue efforts will likely be 
exposed to high and potentially lethal doses of radiation. 
C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident 
a. Law enforcement is responsible for prevention of construction and 
detonation of Improvised Nuclear Devices. 
b. Citizens also have a role in prevention if they are aware of any 
efforts to obtain materials for or to construct such devises. 
2. Post-incident: 
a. Short-term 
(1) Containment of the contaminated area and people will be 
the primary effort to limit the spread of contamination. 
(2) Reception centers, treatment, decontamination and 
sheltering operations must be established. 
b. Long-term - Little can be done to mitigate a nuclear attack except 
to prevent it. 
  
Catastrophic Incident Response Plan 
SCCIRP 
Appendix 9-D-1-4 15 April 2015 
3. Public Protection 
a. Law enforcement will provide reconnaissance, protection, and 
deterrence measures at the boundaries of the attack site. Perimeters 
will be established to prevent entry into the contaminated zone. 
b. Officers will respond to reports of potential threats, provide 
surveillance at vulnerable sites, investigate threats, enforce 
curfews, and prevent looting of property. 
4. Victim Care 
a. Decontamination of victims will be a significant undertaking. 
Short and long term treatment efforts will overwhelm the medical 
system.  Appropriate allocation of resources must be determined.   
b. Decisions will have to be made on the level of care victims will 
receive based on their likelihood of survival.  Many of these 
decisions will be challenged by friends and family members.   
c. Many victims and citizens will require both short and long term 
mental health care. 
5. Investigation/Apprehension 
Law enforcement and, potentially, the military will be involved in the 
investigation of the source of the nuclear materials and the person or 
persons responsible for the construction and detonation of the device. 
6. Recovery/Remediation 
Recovery will take years and cost billions of dollars.  Some areas may 
never be habitable again.  The primary remediation will be prevention. 
IV. STATE RESPONSE 
A. Primary responsible agency: SC Department of Health and Environmental 
Control (SCDHEC), SC Law Enforcement Division (SLED) and all other law 
enforcement agencies as necessary. 
B. Secondary responsible agencies: The South Carolina Emergency Management 
Division (SCEMD). 
C. SERT Actions 
1. The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will immediately 
activate at OPCON I. 
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2. The State will activate the SC Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP) along 
with Appendix 9 (Catastrophic Incident Response Plan) in order to 
provide lines of communication and resource support to the affected 
counties. 
3. A recommendation will be made to the Governor to declare a State of 
Emergency and to seek a Presidential Declaration. 
4. Support activities between the counties and State begin. 
5. The State will notify the SC Forestry Commission to activate a Type II 
Incident Management Team (IMT) and request a Type I Federal Incident 
Management Team. 
6. The SEOC will implement the appropriate EMAC agreements and begin 
assessment of additional needs. 
7. All ESFs will activate to provide support to the affected counties 
Emergency Operations and Response Plans. 
8. The SEOC will notify FEMA Region IV. 
9. Establish the Unified Command Structure at incident sites upon the 
activation of the State response in support of local activities. 
10. The State will also assist in the recovery, response, and mitigation of the 
event. 
V. RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR RESPONSE 
A. The SEOC will serve as the Point of Contact (POC) for resource support from the 
State. 
B. Resources available to respond include but are not limited to: 
 Firefighter Mobilization Act 
 S.C. National Guard 
 S.C. State Guard 
 Civil Support Team (CST) 
 SLED and DHEC WMD Teams 
 Incident Management Teams 
 Regional Medical Assistance Teams (RMAT) 
Catastrophic Incident Response Plan 
SCCIRP 
Appendix 9-D-1-6 15 April 2015 
 DHEC mobile medical facilities 
 Federal Medical Facilities and related personnel  
 Strategic National Medical Stockpiles 
 Mutual Aid Agreements 
 All resources of state agencies. 
VI. ACTIONS BY ESF 
A. SCEMD will assist in developing and coordinating response plans and with GIS 
information. 
B. ESF-1 (Transportation) 
In conjunction with ESF 13 (Law Enforcement), the SC Department of 
Transportation (SCDOT) will identify alternate routes, provide signage and 
barricades to avoid the impacted area, and repair uncontaminated roadways.  
C. ESF-2 (Communications) 
The SC Budget and Control Board, Division of State Information Technology will 
provide additional communication assets to restore communications capabilities 
that may be lost to exposure. 
D. ESF-3 (Public Works and Engineering) 
Public Works and Engineering will assist the affected county/counties in the 
clean-up and removal of contaminated debris as able. 
E. ESF-4 (Firefighting) 
1. The SC Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation is available to 
provide additional firefighting and HAZMAT personnel to fight any 
related fires. 
2. They will also assist in HAZMAT clean-up and decontamination. 
F. ESF-6 (Mass Care) 
1. The SC Department of Social Services (SC DSS) in conjunction with the 
SC Department of Health and Human Services (SCDHHS) will assist. 
2. The American Red Cross in sheltering the displaced population. 
3. They will activate the state Mass Shelter/Evacuation Plan. 
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4. SCDSS will assist in sheltering affected populations. 
G. ESF-7 (Finance and Administration) 
The SC Budget and Control Board, Division of Procurement Services will provide 
support to state agencies in the purchase and distribution of required resources.  
H. ESF-8 (Health and Medical) 
1. SCDHEC will activate their Mass Casualty Plan, and make available 
mobile medical facilities as needed. 
2. Hospitals will also be asked to activate their emergency plans. 
I. ESF-9 (Search and Rescue) 
The SC Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, Division of Fire and Life 
Safety will activate its SC Task Force 1 to assist if search and rescue operations 
and source additional teams as required. 
J. ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) 
SCDHEC will activate their WMD Response Team to assist the affected 
county/counties in the identification, decontamination, clean-up, and 
contaminated debris removal process. 
K. ESF 11 (Food Services) 
SCDSS will activate plans to provide food services to affected victims. 
L. ESF 12 (Energy) 
Coordinate service restoration to affected areas as required. 
M. ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) 
1. In coordination with federal law enforcement agencies, SLED will 
conduct a criminal investigation. 
2. State and local law enforcement agencies will also assist in the evacuation 
and security of the overall incident scene. 
N. ESF 14 (Recovery and Mitigation) 
SCEMD will coordinated recover and mitigation programs to facilitate restoration 
of affected communities. 
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O. ESF 15 (Public Information) 
1. SCEMD and local Public Information Officer’s will utilize all available 
public information resources. 
2. The CODE Red system may be utilized provide general incident 
information, evacuation, sheltering and decontamination site locations. 
P. ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) 
The SC Department of Public Safety (SCDPS) in conjunction with ESF 1 
(Transportation) will direct the exclusion, redirection and entry of the affected 
areas. 
Q. ESF 17 (Animal/Agriculture Emergency Response) 
1. ESF 17 in conjunction with local animal control will identify and open 
shelters available for animal/livestock and for the decontamination 
requirements. 
2. Clemson University Livestock and Poultry Health (CULPH) has legal 
jurisdiction over most animal related situations dealing with emergency or 
disaster scenarios. 
R. ESF 18 (Donated Goods and Volunteer Services) 
The SC Budget and Control Board will coordinate with Volunteer Organizations 
Active in Disasters (VOAD) to facilitate the assignment of service and 
distribution of donated goods. 
S. ESF 19 (Military Support) 
1. The SC National Guard will be mobilized to provide possible evacuation 
and security, as well as assistance to law enforcement. 
2. ESF 19 will coordinate the immediate activation of the Civil Support 
Team (CST). 
T. ESF 24 (Business and Industry) 
The SC Department of Commerce will coordinate with private and public 
business to restore affected services. 
VII. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
For an incident of this magnitude with terrorism involvement, all federal agencies 
may be tasked to support the State’s response. 
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX 9 (CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN) 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
Casualties 10,000 fatalities 
Infrastructure Damage Minimal, other than contamination 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons Not likely 
Contamination Extensive (at site of attack) 
Economic Impact Millions  
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline Weeks 
I. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. Anthrax is an acute infectious disease caused by Bacillus Anthracis. There 
are three different types of Anthrax: coetaneous, inhalational, and 
gastrointestinal. 
2. For the given scenario, the type of disease that will occur is inhalational 
Anthrax.  The initial symptoms of the disease are similar to the common 
cold or flu.  As the disease progresses so do the symptoms. 
3. Symptom onset occurs usually 2-3 days after exposure.   The common 
cold-like symptoms turn into severe breathing problems and shock.  
Inhalational anthrax is usually fatal. 
4. In this scenario, a mass exposure to aerosol anthrax occurs in an indoor 
arena filled with spectators.  The release of the aerosol anthrax happens at 
the beginning of a three hour event, and the maximum seating capacity has 
been reached. 
B. Event Dynamics 
1. Aerosol anthrax is released in an urban indoor arena, with approximately 
18,000 people in attendance for an event. 
2. Local emergency rooms begin to see the first cases approximately 36 
hours post-release.  The rapid progression of symptoms leads to death 
within 1-3 days. 
3. Symptoms do not become identifiable as Anthrax until the fatal phase of 
the disease.  Vaccines are available against some forms of anthrax, but 
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their effectiveness against abnormally high concentrations of the bacteria 
is uncertain. 
4. Antibiotic treatment can be effective, but only if administered prior to the 
onset of symptoms, otherwise the fatality rate can exceed 90%. 
C. Secondary Hazards/Events 
1. Local hospitals and resources will be quickly overwhelmed. 
2. After anthrax has been identified as the source of illness among the 
population and the arena has been confirmed as the place of exposure, 
panic begins to set in among the population.  They become fearful of 
being anywhere a large group has accumulated due to being a possible 
target of another attack. 
3. Portions of the population may also become fearful of contracting the 
illness from already exposed persons, contrary to the public information 
announcements informing the public that inhalational anthrax cannot be 
spread from person to person. 
II. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. This type of attack results in substantial numbers of exposures, including 10,000 
fatalities. 
B. The number of people seeking medical treatment will far exceed the capabilities of 
local and state hospitals, therefore make-shift hospitals will be established and other 
medical facilities will be used. 
C. Hospitals in the city and in the surrounding counties will try to quickly discharge 
patients that are currently utilizing hospital beds by canceling elective and semi-
elective surgical procedures. 
D. Intensive care bed capacity could be increased by temporarily lodging patients with 
inhalation anthrax in post-anesthesia care units. 
E. The incident will likely result in several million dollars in damage to the arena, but 
should not affect any surrounding buildings.  The clean-up/decontamination of the 
arena will take some time, and ticket sales may be impacted after it re-opens. 
F. The local tourism industry may also be impacted greatly as a result of this incident.   
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III. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Initial Emergency Assessment 
1. The arena will be isolated. 
2. The impact of the attack will be monitored, the type of incident will be 
classified, and the needed resources will be determined. 
3. Environmental testing will take place inside the building and in the 
surrounding areas outside of the building to determine the risk of 
continued exposure. 
4. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) will conduct supplemental 
sampling to confirm that anthrax was the agent used in the attack. 
5. The identification of anthrax strain and the determination of any drug 
resistance will also be required. 
B. Emergency Management/Response 
1. Local Emergency Operation Centers (EOC) and the State Emergency 
Operation Center (SEOC) will be activated and used to manage the 
response to the attack. 
2. Requests for resources and assistance will be forwarded through the 
SEOC. 
3. Access control points will be activated and manned around the arena. 
4. Public alerts will be sent out and treatment sites will be activated. 
C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident 
a. Maintain security measures at the appropriate level (i.e. metal 
detectors, cameras, searches, and exclusion of bags). 
b. Maintain a secure vendor network with credentialing. 
c. Report and do not open suspicious packages. 
d. Restrict air space. 
e. Have properly informed and trained staff on hand. 
f. Establish multi-jurisdictional aid agreements in effect. 
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2. Post-incident 
a. Short-term 
1. The public will be notified. 
2. There will be provisions of Post Exposure Prophylactics 
(PEP) for the contaminated. 
3. There will be provision of personal protective equipment for 
responders. 
4. If needed, mobilization of the Strategic National Stockpile 
will occur. 
b. Long-term.  Not applicable because person-to-person spread does 
not occur. 
D. Public Protection 
1. In order to protect the public, it will be necessary to provide 
symptom/exposure information. 
2. The flow of traffic and access control points should be monitored and 
carefully managed. 
E. Victim Care 
1. The public will be informed of the signs and symptoms of inhalational 
anthrax. 
2. Non-hospital patient screening clinics will be established.  
3. Treatment/distribution centers for PEP and vaccinations will be 
established. 
4. Approximately 12,000 people will need to be hospitalized, and will 
require ventilators due to advanced critical care needs. 
5. National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) 
a. A part of the Department of Human and Health Services. 
b. NDMS will be used to temporarily supplement the medical 
response to a disaster area, by providing personnel, supplies, and 
equipment.   
c. NDMS will aid in the patient movement from a disaster site to 
unaffected areas of the nation if necessary. 
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F. Investigation/Apprehension 
Local law enforcement along with federal agencies will conduct investigations to 
deter and apprehend all involved parties. 
G. Recovery/Remediation 
1. Anthrax is long-lived in the environment, therefore extensive 
decontamination in and around the site will be required. 
2. Environmental testing in the immediate area will continue. 
3. Site restoration will cost millions of dollars and require input from both 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the CDC. 
IV. STATE RESPONSE 
A. The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) is the 
primary state agency. 
B. Secondary State agencies are SCEMD, the SC Law Enforcement Division 
(SLED), the SC Department of Social Services (SCDSS) and the SC Employment 
Security Commission. 
C. SERT Actions 
1. The state will activate its Emergency Operations Plan along with 
Appendix 9 (Catastrophic Incident Response Plan), and, if determined to 
be an act of terrorism, Appendix 8 (Terrorism Operations Plan). 
2. Activation of these plans will allow for lines of communication and 
necessary resource support to the affected counties. 
3. The SEOC will immediately activate at OPCON 2. 
4. The SERT will make a recommendation to the Governor to declare a State 
of Emergency and to seek a Federal Declaration.  
5. Begin support activities between the counties and State. 
6. The State will notify the SC Forestry Commission to place a Type III 
Incident Management Team (IMT) on standby. 
7. The SEOC will activate the following ESFs: 4 (Firefighting), 6 (Mass 
Care), 8 (Health & Medical Services), 10 (Hazardous Material), 13 (Law 
Enforcement), 15 (Public Information), and 19 (Military Support).  The 
remaining ESFs may be activated as necessary to provide support to the 
affected counties Emergency Operations and Response Plans. 
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8. Appropriate EMAC agreements will be implemented and assessment of 
additional needs will begin. 
9. The SEOC will notify FEMA Region IV. 
10. Establish the Unified Command Structure upon activation of the State 
response in support of local activities. 
11. The State will assist in the recovery, response, and mitigation to the event.  
12. State operations will be incorporated into a Joint Field Office (JFO) if 
established. 
D. Resources Available For Responses 
1. The SEOC will serve as the point of contact for resource support from the 
State. 
2. Resources available to respond include but are not limited to: 
a. Firefighter Mobilization Act 
b. S.C. National Guard 
c. S.C. State Guard 
d. Civil Support Team (CST) 
e. SLED and SCDHEC WMD Teams 
f. Incident Management Teams 
g. Regional Medical Assistance Teams (RMAT) 
h. SCDHEC mobile medical facilities 
i. Federal Medical Facilities and related personnel  
j. Strategic National Stockpile 
k. Mutual Aid Agreements 
l. All resources of state agencies. 
V. ACTIONS BY ESF 
A. SCEMD will assist in developing and coordinating response plans and with GIS 
information. 
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B. ESF-4 (Firefighting) 
The SC Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation is available to provide 
resources through the Firefighter Mobilization Act, HAZMAT personnel to assist 
in the decontamination of the exposure site. 
C. ESF-6 (Mass Care) 
SCDSS will activate plans and protocols to assist victims that may be displaced 
due to contamination of residences and may be adversely economically impacted. 
D. ESF-8 (Health and Medical) 
1. SCDHEC will activate their Mass Casualty Plan and advise area hospitals 
to activate emergency operations plans. 
2. SCDHEC will make available their Mobile Medical Facilities to 
accommodate additional victims. 
E. ESF-10 (Hazardous Materials) 
SCDHEC will activate their WMD Response Team to aid in the identification and 
decontamination process. 
F. ESF-13 (Law Enforcement) 
1. SLED will coordinate the law enforcement response to include quarantine 
enforcement, investigation and prevention of subsequent attacks. 
2. SLED will activate its WMD Team. 
3. SLED will liaise with federal law enforcement agencies involved with the 
response. 
G. ESF-15 (Public Information) 
SCEMD in conjunction with local Public Information Officers will provide 
general incident information to include general disease information, quarantine 
information, and updates on efforts to control the spread of exposure. 
H. ESF-19 (Military Support) 
1. The South Carolina National Guard (SCNG) will be alerted to provide 
possible support to law enforcement agencies. 
2. The SCNG will activate the Civil Support Team (CST) in support of the 
decontamination process of victims and incident location. 
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VI. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
For an incident of this magnitude with terrorism involvement, all federal agencies may be 
tasked to support the State’s response. 
 
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX 9 (CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN) 
SCENARIO 4 - BIOLOGICAL ATTACK-PLAGUE 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
Casualties 3,000 fatalities 
Infrastructure Damage None 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons Possible 
Contamination Several hours duration 
Economic Impact Millions  
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline Weeks 
I. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. The agent that causes the plague is Yersinia pestis (Y. pestis). The disease 
is constantly present in certain wild animals such as rats, mice, and 
squirrels.  Cats, dogs, and goats may serve as hosts and can infect humans. 
2. There are three types of plague: bubonic, septicemic and pneumonic. 
a. Bubonic plague is the most common and it is an infection of the 
lymph nodes. 
b. Bubonic plague and septicemic plague cannot be transferred from 
human to human but the pneumonic plague can. 
c. The pneumonic plague is the most serious form of the plague.  It 
occurs when the Y. pestis bacteria infects the lungs and cause 
pneumonia.  It can be transmitted by droplets from human-to-
human, such as infected person coughing or sneezing. 
3. The pneumonic plague would be the most likely type of plague used in a 
biological attack. 
a. Symptoms usually develop within 1-3 days after exposure but they 
can develop as soon as a few hours after exposure. 
b. The symptoms are shortness of breath, chest pain, cough, fever, 
headache and sometimes bloody or watery sputum. 
c. If suspected and diagnosed early, effective antibiotics can be given 
to the infected person. 
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d. If treatment is not received within the first 24 hours of when the 
first symptoms occurred, death may be inevitable. 
4. Approximately 10-20 people in the United States develop plague each 
year, and about 1 in 7 of those die from the disease.  Almost all persons 
with pneumonic plague die if not treated. 
5. Yersinia Pestis is easily destroyed by disinfectants, heat, and sunlight. 
However, depending on the conditions, the bacteria can survive up to 1 
hour when released into the air. 
6. In this scenario, the plague is disseminated via an agricultural sprayer 
loaded onto two trucks.  The trucks discharge the spray in two separate 
locations within the city limits of an urban area in our state. 
B. Event Dynamics 
1. The release of the plague agent by truck-borne agricultural sprayers occurs 
in two separate locations in the city but the attacks are carried out almost 
simultaneously. 
2. Alerts are triggered quickly as the numbers escalate of people who were 
previously healthy and now have severe respiratory symptoms. 
3. Two days post-release, both abandoned trucks are found and an 
investigation ensues.  Laboratory analysis of swabs taken from the 
abandoned trucks and patients establish a presumptive diagnosis of Y. 
pestis. 
4. Symptoms progress rapidly among victims.  Many victims are untreated or 
inappropriately treated. 
5. 14% of those infected will die. 
C. Secondary Hazards/Events 
1. Large numbers of worried patients will crowd the local emergency rooms. 
2. As pneumonic plague is transmissible from person-to-person, therefore the 
state will be subject to travel restrictions. 
3. Voluntary “snow day” restrictions will be recommended as a self-
protective measure for the general public. 
4. The local and state economy will be impacted. Many local businesses 
suffer due to the lack of tourism, absenteeism of employees, and the 
overall fear of the general public. 
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5. Following a release in the environment, plague may become established 
within animal populations, which then pose a risk of ongoing exposure to 
humans through bites. 
II. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. The number of people in the primary exposure group is estimated to be around 
2,000. 
B. The secondary transmission rate is one secondary infected person per primary 
infected person.  Therefore, roughly 4,000 people are expected to be exposed to 
the plague. 
C. The percentage of casualties among the exposed are expected to be high for two 
reasons. 
1. The symptoms progress so rapidly that by the time treatment is received, it 
is often too late. 
2. Many people will most likely be treated inappropriately during the initial 
period of time before lab results come back positively identifying the 
plague as the culprit. 
D. The final death toll is expected to reach approximately 3,000 people or 75% of 
infected people. 
E. Many of the plague survivors will become permanently disabled as a result of 
their illness.  Many victims will likely suffer from mental health issues associated 
with the mass trauma they have experienced. 
F. Service disruptions will be significant for pharmacies and hospitals due to 
overwhelming casualty needs.  Makeshift hospitals will need to be established 
within the area because the transportation of patients to surrounding county 
hospitals will be discouraged. 
G. It will be necessary to close or restrict certain modes of transportation.  As a 
result, many millions of dollars could be lost in State revenue. 
III. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Initial Emergency Assessment 
1. Detection of the plague should include laboratory identification of the 
strain and a determination of the potentially known antimicrobial drug 
resistance.  Origin of the initial contaminant will be traced back to the 
source. 
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2. Animal-based surveillance will be established to monitor potential spread 
of plague via natural methods. 
B. Emergency Management/Response 
1. The public will be notified of the incident, the symptoms of exposure and 
the proper precautions to take. 
2. The mobilization of the National Strategic Stockpile (SNS) may occur if 
needed. 
3. Traffic and access control points will be activated. 
4. Treatment sites will be activated. Quarantine measures will be taken 
including shelter-in-place recommendations. 
5. The State Emergency Operation Center (SEOC) will coordinate with the 
county EOCs in areas which the incidents occurred to manage and make 
requests for resources and assistance. 
C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident 
a. Due to the nature of the event, pre-disaster mitigation may prove 
difficult. 
b. Proper training and adequate resources may reduce the impact. 
2. Post-incident 
a. Short-term 
(1) Persons with primary exposure to the plague need to 
receive antibiotic therapy within 24 hours in order to 
prevent near certain fatality. 
(2) Epidemiological assessments, including contact 
investigation and notification, will be needed. 
(3) Actions of incident-site personnel tested after the attack 
include hazard identification and site control, establishment 
and operation of the ICS, isolation and treatment of 
exposed victims, mitigation efforts, obtainment of PPE and 
prophylaxis for responders, site remediation and 
monitoring, notification of airlines and other transportation 
providers, provision of public information, and effective 
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coordination with local, state, national and international 
public health and governmental agencies. 
b. Long-term 
(1) Planning and efficient distribution of resources will be 
essential. 
(2) All responders and health care providers should be 
equipped with PPE’s and safety gear for possible plague 
incidents. 
(3) The nature of the disease spreads rapidly and public 
information dissemination needs to be immediate. 
(4) Long-term prevention will depend on identification and 
apprehension of terrorist before incidents occur. 
D. Public Protection 
1. The public should be informed of signs and symptoms of the plague.   
2. Victims must be treated and/or quarantined. 
3. Responders, health care workers, and exposed persons will receive 
antimicrobial prophylaxis. 
4. The SNS may also be mobilized for additional critical supplies and 
antibiotics. 
E. Victim Care 
1. Responders and health care providers should wear masks and other 
personal protective equipment. 
2. Several thousand people will require treatment or prophylaxis with 
ventilators and antibiotics. 
3. Public information should provide measures an infected person can take to 
prevent secondary transmission.  The timely dissemination of information 
is important to allow citizens to make informed plans and decisions. 
4. Mortuary requirements and veterinary services will need to be considered. 
F. Investigation/Apprehension 
Local and state law enforcement will assist the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations and the Department of Homeland security in conducting an 
investigation.  
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G. Recovery/Remediation 
1. Incident site personnel should close the sites of the incidents for at least 24 
hours and conduct environmental testing. 
2. Extensive clean-up and decontamination should not be needed because 
plague cannot live long in the environment.  It is not viable when exposed 
to heat and sunlight. 
IV. STATE RESPONSE 
A. The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) is the 
primary state agency. 
B. Secondary responsible agencies are SC Emergency Management Division 
(SCEMD), SC Law Enforcement Division (SLED) and SC Department of Social 
Services (SCDSS). 
C. SERT Actions 
1. The State will activate the State Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP) 
along with Appendix 9 (Catastrophic Incident Response Plan) and 
Appendix 8 (Terrorism Operations Plan).  Activation of these plans will 
allow for lines of communication and necessary resource support to the 
affected counties. 
2. The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will immediately 
activate at OPCON 2. 
3. A recommendation will be made to the Governor to declare a state of 
emergency and to seek a possible Federal Disaster Declaration. 
4. Begin support activities between the counties and the State. 
5. The SEOC will notify the SC Forestry Commission to place a type III 
Incident Management Team (IMT) on standby. 
6. Appropriate EMAC agreements will be implemented and assessment of 
additional needs will begin. 
7. The SEOC will activate the following ESFs: 4 (Firefighting), 6 (Mass 
Care), 8 (Health and Medical Services), 10 (Hazardous Material), 13 (Law 
Enforcement), 15 (Public Information), and 19 (Military Support).  The 
remaining ESFs may be activated as necessary to provide support to the 
affected counties Emergency Operations and Response Plans. 
8. The SEOC will notify FEMA Region IV. 
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9. Establish the Unified Command Structure. 
10. The State will also assist in the recovery, response, and mitigation to the 
event. 
11. State operations will be incorporated into a federal Joint Field Office 
(JFO) if established. 
V. RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR RESPONSES 
A. The SEOC will serve as the Point of Contact for resource support from the State. 
B. Resources available to respond include but are not limited to: 
 Firefighter Mobilization Act  
 S.C. National Guard 
 S.C. State Guard 
 Civil Support Team (CST) 
 SLED and DHEC WMD Teams 
 Incident Management Teams 
 Regional Medical Assistance Teams (RMAT) 
 DHEC mobile medical facilities 
 Federal Medical Facilities and related personnel  
 Strategic National Stockpiles 
 Mutual Aid Agreements 
 All resources of state agencies 
VI. ACTIONS BY ESF 
A. SCEMD will assist in developing and coordinating response plans and with GIS 
information. 
B. ESF 4 (Firefighting) 
The SC Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation is available to 
provide resources through the Firefighter Mobilization Act, HAZMAT 
personnel to assist in the decontamination of the exposure sight. 
C. ESF 6 (Mass Care) 
1. SCDSS will activate plans and protocols to assist victims that may be 
displaced due to contamination of residences  
Catastrophic Incident Response Plan 
SCCIRP 
Appendix 9-D-4-8 15 April 2015 
D. ESF 8 (Health and Medical Services) 
1. SCDHEC will activate their Mass Casualty Plan and advise area hospitals to 
activate emergency operations plans. 
2. SCDHEC will make available their Mobile Medical Facilities to 
accommodate additional victims and establish quarantine procedures. 
E. ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) 
SCDHEC will activate their WMD Response Team to assist the affected 
county in the decontamination process. 
F. ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) 
1. SLED will coordinate the law enforcement response to include quarantine 
enforcement, investigation and prevention of subsequent attacks. 
2. SLED will liaise with federal law enforcement agencies involved with the 
response. 
G. ESF 15 (Public Information) 
ESF-15 in conjunction with local Public Information Officers will provide 
general incident information to include general disease information, 
quarantine information, and updates on efforts to control the spread of 
exposure.  
H. ESF 19 (Military Support) 
1. The South Carolina National Guard (SCNG) will mobilize to provide 
possible support to law enforcement agencies. 
2. The SCNG may activate the CST in support of the decontamination process 
of victims and incident location. 
VII. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
For an incident of this magnitude with possible terrorism involvement, all federal 
agencies may be tasked to support the State’s response. 
 
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX 9 (CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN) 
SCENARIO 5 - CHEMICAL ATTACK-BLISTER AGENT 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
Casualties Over 100 fatalities 
Infrastructure Damage Minimal 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons More than 80,000 
Contamination Structures affected 
Economic Impact Millions  
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline Weeks or months  
I. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. Blister agents are chemical compounds that are named for their ability to 
cause painful water blisters.  Blister Agents cause severe skin, eye, and 
mucosal pain and irritation. 
2. Blister Agents are liquids that can form vapor that floats into the air, 
therefore making them easily absorbable through the lungs, eyes, and skin.  
People can be exposed by either touching the liquid or breathing the 
vapor. 
3. Exposure to vapor becomes evident in 4-6 hours, and exposure to the skin 
becomes evident in 2-48 hours. 
4. The longer the blister agent remains on the skin or is being inhaled, the 
sicker the exposed person will become.  Flu-like symptoms or bronchitis 
may follow the initial symptoms.  Days later, the body may be unable to 
fight off infection and this could lead to more serious illnesses such as 
pneumonia. 
5. Most blister agents are in one of three groups:  sulfur mustards, nitrogen 
mustards, and Lewisite.  The effects of being exposed to Lewisite are 
immediate.  The other two mustard agents usually do not show the effects 
from exposure immediately. 
6. The main treatment for blister agents is to relieve symptoms.  Those 
exposed to large amounts of blister agents can die, but a majority of the 
people exposed gets well. 
7. In this scenario, a light aircraft sprays chemical agent Yellow (which is a 
50/50 mixture of the blister agents mustard and lewisite) into a packed 
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college football stadium.  The stadium is located in an urban area in the 
state.  The agent directly contaminates the stadium and the immediate 
surrounding area and generates a downwind vapor hazard. 
B. Event Dynamics 
1. A low flying plane sprays chemical agent Yellow into the stadium. 
2. Initially spectators are shocked by the sight of a yellow-brown color liquid 
with a strong garlic-like odor being released from the rear of the plane.  
Then quickly their shock turns into mass panic. 
3. Victims will immediately evacuate the stadium.  Many people are killed or 
injured from falling or being crushed as a result of the chaos that ensues 
during the evacuation. 
C. Secondary Hazards/Events 
1. Many injuries and fatalities occur as a result of the mass panic.  Not only 
are people crushed while evacuating the stadium, but also motor vehicle 
accidents are expected to occur in the surrounding perimeter of the 
stadium. 
2. The vapor hazard will persist until the stadium is decontaminated, but it 
will decrease with time. 
II. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. The maximum seating capacity in the stadium has been reached, with a total of 
80,000 occupants. 
B. Of the total stadium attendees, 70% or 56,000 people are exposed to the liquid 
during the attack.  The remaining 30% (24,000) of attendees are exposed to vapor 
contamination. 
C. Eighty fatalities occur during the evacuation of the stadium. Motor vehicle 
accidents will result in 8 fatalities and 40 injuries.  These casualties all occur 
within one hour of the attack. 
D. Liquid contamination results in 28 fatalities and 28,000 injuries with 2,800 people 
suffering permanent disability. 
E. In order to prevent the spread of the agent, decontamination should occur as soon 
as possible after the attack. 
F. Overwhelming demand will disrupt communications in the local area, and some 
fleeing victims may contaminate public transportation or other facilities. 
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III. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Initial Emergency Assessment 
1. The attack should be instantly recognized by on-scene personnel.  The 
agent used in the attack should be identified by HAZMAT teams. 
2. Agent detection, hazard assessment, monitoring, and sampling should be 
ongoing during and after the attack. 
B. Emergency Management/Response 
1. The public will be notified immediately by activating the State’s 
notification system and utilizing the media. 
2. The incident-site should be isolated and traffic and access control points 
should be manned. 
3. The county Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in the affected area will 
coordinate with the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) for 
resource support and requests for assistance. 
4. Several mass-decontamination lines will be set up at the perimeter of the 
site immediately following the attack. 
5. Search and rescue teams will most likely be activated. 
C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident 
a. Due to the nature of the incident, pre-disaster mitigation may prove 
difficult. 
b. Through proper training of support staff and adequate resources, 
fatalities may be reduced. 
c. No-Fly-Zone ordinances should be in place. 
2. Post-incident 
a. Short-term 
(1) Adverse health effects caused by Lewisite depend on the 
amount people are exposed to, the route of exposure, and 
the length of time that people are exposed. 
(2) Victims should leave the area where the Lewisite was 
released and get to fresh air.   Once outside victims should 
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move to the highest ground possible, because Lewisite is 
heavier than air and will sink to low-lying areas. 
(3) Clothing should be removed rapidly and entire body should 
be washed with soap and water.  Any clothing that has to 
be pulled over the head should be cut off the body instead 
of pulled over the head. 
(4) Decontamination sites should be established in a safe 
location near the incident site. 
(5) If Lewisite was ingested victim should not drink fluids or 
induce vomiting. 
(6)  An antidote for Lewisite is available and is most useful if 
given as soon as possible after exposure. 
b. Long-term.  A stockpile of the Lewisite antidote should be 
procured and kept available for emergency responders and hospital 
staff. 
D. Public Protection 
The population located near the stadium will be evacuated and/or 
sheltered. 
E. Victim Care 
1. Thousands of people will require decontamination. 
2. Many people will only be contaminated on their clothing.  Those victims 
will promptly remove their clothing and wash off with soap and 
compounds like Fuller’s Earth before the agent has a chance to penetrate 
the skin. 
3. If contact with skin and eyes occur, then most likely decontamination will 
not significantly reduce the injury. 
4. In order to significantly reduce tissue damage decontamination needs to 
occur within 1-2 minutes after coming into contact with the skin, but this 
would be nearly impossible to accomplish. 
5. Thousands of people will also require long-term as well as short-term 
treatment. 
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F. Investigation/Apprehension 
Local law enforcement will assist the Federal Bureau of Investigations and 
Department of Homeland Security in conducting a criminal investigation. 
G. Recovery/Remediation 
1. The stadium and any adjacent buildings that may be affected will be 
decontaminated. 
2. Decontamination could be a lengthy process, lasting anywhere from weeks 
to months, because some materials may be difficult or impossible to 
decontaminate. 
3. The entire site may need to be replaced because of the psychological 
impact on future usability. 
4. There will be on-going environmental testing. 
5. Cars located within the vicinity will be decontaminated, and any 
contaminated personal property and equipment would be incinerated.  
IV. STATE RESPONSE 
A. The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) is the 
primary state agency.  
B. Secondary responsible agencies 
1. The South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) will 
support response agencies through the coordination of State and federal 
resources.  
2. The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) will lead the 
State’s investigation in response to the incident. 
3. The SC Department of Social Services (SCDSS) will assist victims’ 
families that are impacted socially and economically.  
C. SERT Actions 
1. The State will activate the SC Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP) along 
with Appendix 9 (Catastrophic Incident Response Plan). 
2. If it is determined to be an act of terrorism, The State will activate 
Appendix 8 (Terrorism Operations Plan). 
3. Activation of these plans will allow for lines of communication and 
necessary resource support to the affected counties. 
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4. State operations will be incorporated into a federal Joint Field Office 
(JFO) if established. 
5. The SEOC will immediately activate at OPCON 2. 
6. The SEOC will make a recommendation to the Governor to declare a State 
of Emergency and to seek a possible Federal Disaster Declaration. 
7. Begin support activities between the counties and State. 
8. The SEOC will notify the SC Forestry Commission to place a Type III 
Incident Management Team (IMT) on standby. 
9. The SEOC will implement the appropriate EMAC agreements and 
assessment of additional needs will begin. 
10. The SECO will activate the following ESFs: 1 (Transportation), 4 
(Firefighting), 6 (Mass Care), 8 (Health and Medical Services), 10 
(Hazardous Material), 13 (Law Enforcement), 15 (Public Information), 16 
(Emergency Traffic Management) and 19 (Military Support).  The 
remaining ESFs may be activated as necessary to provide support to the 
affected counties Emergency Operations and Response Plans. 
11. The SEOC will notify FEMA Region IV. 
12. Establish the Unified Command Structure. 
13. The State will also assist in the response, recovery and mitigation to the 
event. 
D. Resources Available For Responses 
1. The SEOC will serve as the Point of Contact for resource support from the 
State. 
2. Resources available to respond include but are not limited to: 
 Firefighter Mobilization Act 
 S.C. National Guard 
 S.C. State Guard 
 Civil Support Team (CST) 
 SLED and SCDHEC WMD Teams 
 Incident Management Teams 
 Regional Medical Assistance Teams (RMAT) 
 SCDHEC mobile medical facilities 
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 Federal Medical Facilities and related personnel  
 Strategic National Stockpile 
 All resources of state agencies. 
V. ACTIONS BY ESF 
A. SCEMD will assist in developing and coordinating response plans and with GIS 
information. 
B. ESF 1 (Transportation) 
1. In conjunction with ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) and 
Department of Transportation, identify alternate routes and provide 
signage to avoid the impacted area. 
C. ESF 4 (Firefighting) 
The SC Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation is available to 
provide resources through the Firefighter Mobilization Act; HAZMAT 
personnel to assist in the decontamination of victims and the exposure site. 
D. ESF 6 (Mass Care) 
SCDSS will activate plans and protocols to assist victims that may be 
displaced due to contamination to residences caused by contaminated 
individuals. 
E. ESF 8 (Health and Medical Services) 
1. SCDHEC will activate the Mass Casualty Plan and advise area hospitals to 
activate emergency operations plans 
2. SCDHEC will make available their Mobile Medical Facilities to 
accommodate additional victims. 
F. ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) 
SCDHEC will activate their WMD Response Team to assist CSTs in the 
identification and decontamination process. 
G. ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) 
1. SLED will coordinate the law enforcement response to include quarantine 
enforcement, investigation and prevention of subsequent attacks. 
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2. The SLED WMD team will coordinate the decontamination process. 
SLED will liaise with federal law enforcement agencies involved with the 
response. 
H. ESF 15 (Public Information) 
ESF 15 in conjunction with local Public Information Officers will provide 
general incident information to include general exposure information and 
updates on efforts to minimize exposure. 
I. ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) 
1. The SC Department of Public Safety (SCPDS) will in conjunction with 
ESF 1 (Transportation) provide direction away from and restrict entry into 
the exposed areas 
J. ESF 19 (Military Support) 
1. The SC National Guard will be alerted to provide possible support to law 
enforcement agencies. 
2. The CST may be activated in support of the decontamination process of 
victims, incident location, and agent detection/identification. 
VI. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
For an incident of this magnitude with possible terrorism involvement, all federal 
agencies may be tasked to support the State’s response. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
Casualties 137 fatalities 
Infrastructure Damage 50% of structures in area of explosion 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons 
50,000 are asked to shelter-in-place 
10,000 are evacuated 
70,000 self-evacuate 
Contamination Yes 
Economic Impact Billions  
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline Months 
I. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. Toxic Industrial Chemicals can be in a gas, liquid, or solid state. 
2. TICs can be chemical (eg. carcinogens, corrosives, or agents that can 
affect the lungs or blood) or physical (eg. flammables or explosives) 
hazards.  They can enter through the skin, inhalation, or digestion. 
3. The time it takes for these chemicals to affect the body depends on where 
the agent enters.  The time the chemical lasts in the environment depends 
on the physical state of the chemical, weather conditions, and chemical 
stability, whether it was released indoors or outdoors, quantity of release, 
and method of release. 
4. Large quantities of Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC) are manufactured, 
stored, and transported in the United States making them a prime target for 
terrorists. 
5. In this scenario, a wastewater treatment plant in an urban area of the state 
is attacked.  The suspects use two, large Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IED) to carry out the attack. 
6. The detonation of the IEDs releases two toxic chemicals into the air.  One 
of the toxic chemicals released is chlorine and the other is hydrogen 
sulfide. 
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B. Event Dynamics 
1. Two IEDs are placed in crates and then into shipping containers to be 
delivered to a wastewater treatment facility.  Both of the IEDs are wired 
with remote triggers. 
2. A huge explosion and fire occurs and the release of the toxic industrial 
chemicals is immediate. 
3. Almost all of the workers in the treatment plant are killed.  The few that 
survive are seriously injured. 
4. Fires resulting from the attack would take many hours, possibly days, to 
extinguish. 
C. Secondary Hazards/Event 
1. First responders will order the evacuation of areas immediately threatened 
by the fire. 
2. The plume is traveling down-wind. 
3. As soon as the involvement of one or more TIC is clear, they will order a 
shelter-in-place of a 45 degree arc centered north-north-east of the site and 
extending 6 miles; this will affect 50,000 people. 
4. Many people in this area will self-evacuate, clogging roads and delaying 
response assets. 
5. Numerous injuries will occur as a result of the population panic once 
downwind casualties begin to occur.  More injuries are expected to occur 
due to panicked motorists being involved in accidents in the surrounding 
roadways. 
6. Significant contamination will occur in the surrounding waterways. 
II. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. Injuries and fatalities will result due to panic during evacuation. 
B. Five fatalities and 40 injuries will occur within 1 hour of the attack, from motor-
vehicle accidents and bodies being crushed during the chaotic evacuation of the 
stadium. 
C. The fires from the explosion will cause 30 fatalities and 80 injuries.  Most of the 
injuries from the fire will be either from burns, smoke inhalation, 
blast/fragmentation, or a combination of all three. 
D. Liquid contamination will result in 2 fatalities and 70 injuries. 
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E. Vapor, particulate, and aerosol exposure will account for the remaining 100 
casualties and 1,000 injuries. 
F.  Some of the injuries acquired during the incident or as a direct result of the 
incident will be permanently disabling. 
G. A total of 137 fatalities and 1,190 injuries are associated with the incident. 
H. The contaminated waterways may result in long-term prohibitions on swimming 
and fishing. 
I. Communications will be disrupted in the local area due to overwhelming demand. 
J. Significant disruptions in health-care occur due to the overwhelming demand of 
the injured and the “worried well”. 
III. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Initial Emergency Assessment 
1. The detection of Toxic Industrial Chemicals will occur. 
2. Hazard assessment, prediction, monitoring, and sampling will also occur. 
B. Emergency Management Response 
1. Alerts and notification systems will be activated immediately to warn the 
public of the incident. 
2. Traffic and access control points are activated. 
3. The State Emergency Operation Center (SEOC) will coordinate resource 
support and requests for assistance with the Emergency Operation Center 
(EOC) in the county where the attack took place. 
4. Public information activities will begin. 
C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident 
Deterrence measures must be taken by visibly increasing security 
and apprehension potential at the site before and during the attack. 
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2. Post-incident 
a. Short-term 
(1) Mitigation measures will be complicated by secondary 
device concerns (i.e., delayed detonation of IEDs). 
(2) After the attack, incident-site personnel must 
 Isolate and define the hazard 
 Establish, plan, and operate incident command 
 Fight fires 
 Conduct bomb disposal dispatch and IED render-
safe procedures 
 Preserve the scene 
 Decontaminate responders 
 Conduct site remediation and monitoring. 
b. Long-term 
(1) There will be significant damage to the treatment plant as a 
result of the attack and subsequent fires 
(2) Cleanup of the site and other contaminated areas will occur.   
(3) Decontamination of the waterway may present significant 
challenges. 
(4) Environmental testing will be ongoing. 
D. Public Protection 
Evacuation and/or sheltering of downwind populations will be required. 
E. Victim Care 
1. There are more than 700 people with severe injuries such as trauma, burns, 
and smoke inhalation. 
2. There are 100 more with severe respiratory distress.  Several thousand 
may require respiratory assistance. 
3. Victims may require short-term and long-term treatment. 
4. Some victims will require decontamination. 
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5. Victims will receive emergency aid.  Hospital and EMS personnel will 
triage and treat/stabilize victims. 
6. Patients will be screened and decontaminated. 
F. Investigation/Apprehension 
Actions of the incident-site personnel after the attack include dispatch, site 
control, criminal investigation, pursuit and tactical deployment, and 
apprehension of suspects. 
G. Recovery/Remediation 
1. Decontamination of site and other contaminated areas will occur. 
2. Disposal of decontaminated wastes. 
3. Environmental testing and public information activities will continue. 
4. Repair of destroyed or damaged buildings will begin. 
5. Decontamination of the waterway may present a challenge. 
6. Environmental issues are likely to significantly delay rebuilding efforts. 
IV. STATE RESPONSE 
A. The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) is the 
primary state agency. 
B. Secondary responsible agencies are the South Carolina Emergency Management 
Division (SCEMD), the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) and 
the SC Department of Social Services (DSS). 
C. SERT Actions 
1. The State will activate the SC Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP) along 
with Appendix 9 (Catastrophic Incident Response Plan).  If it is 
determined to be an act of terrorism, the State will activate Appendix 8 
(Terrorism Operations Plan).  Activation of these plans will allow for lines 
of communication and necessary resource support to the affected counties. 
2. The SEOC will immediately activate at OPCON 2. 
3. The SEOC will make a recommendation to the Governor to declare a State 
of Emergency and to seek a possible Federal Disaster Declaration. 
4. Begin support activities between the counties and State. 
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5. The SEOC will notify the SC Forestry Commission to place a Type III 
Incident Management Team (IMT) on standby. 
6. The SEOC will implement the appropriate EMAC agreements and 
assessment of additional needs will begin. 
7. The SECO will activate the following ESFs: 1 (Transportation), 4 
(Firefighting), 6 (Mass Care), 8 (Health and Medical Services), 10 
(Hazardous Material), 13 (Law Enforcement), 15 (Public Information), 16 
(Emergency Traffic Management) and 19 (Military Support). The 
remaining ESFs may be activated as necessary to provide support to the 
affected counties Emergency Operations and Response Plans. 
8. The SEOC will notify FEMA Region IV. 
9. Establish the Unified Command Structure. 
10. The State will assist in the recovery, response, and mitigation of the event.  
11. State operations will be incorporated into a federal Joint Field Office 
(JFO) if established. 
D. Resources Available For Responses 
1. The SEOC will serve as the Point of Contact for resource support from the 
State. 
2. Resources available to respond include:  
 Firefighter Mobilization Act 
 S.C. National Guard 
 S.C. National Guard Civil Support Team (CST) 
 SLED WMD Team 
 SCDHEC WMD Team 
 Incident Management Teams 
 Regional Medical Assistance Teams (RMAT) 
 SCDHEC mobile medical facilities 
 Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) 
 Strategic National Stockpile 
 Law enforcement personnel through mutual aid. 
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V. ACTIONS BY ESF 
A. SCEMD will assist in developing and coordinating response plans and with GIS 
information. 
E. ESF 1 (Transportation) 
In conjunction with ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) and the SC 
Department of Transportation (SCDOT), identify alternate routes and 
provide signage and barricades to avoid the impacted area. 
F. ESF 4 (Firefighting) 
The SC Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation is available to 
provide through the Firefighter Mobilization Act, HAZMAT personnel to 
assist in the decontamination of victims and the exposure sight. 
G. ESF 6 (Mass Care) 
1. SCDSS will activate plans and protocols to assist victims that may be 
displaced due to contamination of residences and may be adversely 
economically impacted. 
H. ESF 8 (Health and Medical) 
1. SCDHEC will activate their Mass Casualty Plan and advise area hospitals 
to activate emergency operations plans. 
2. SCDHEC will make available their Mobile Medical Facilities to 
accommodate additional victims. 
I. ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) 
SCDHEC will activate their WMD Response Team to assist in the 
identification and decontamination process. 
J. ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) 
1. SLED will coordinate the law enforcement response, investigation and 
prevention of subsequent attacks. 
2. SLED will liaise with federal law enforcement agencies involved with the 
response. 
K. ESF 15 (Public Information) 
In conjunction with local Public Information Officers, provide general 
incident information to include general exposure information and updates 
on efforts to minimize exposure. 
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L. ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) 
In conjunction with ESF 1 (Transportation), provide direction away from 
the incident and restrict entry into the exposed areas. 
M. ESF 19 (Military Support) 
1. The SC National Guard will be alerted to provide possible support to law 
enforcement agencies. 
2. The CST may be activated in support of the decontamination process of 
victims and incident location. 
VI. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
For an incident of this magnitude with possible terrorism involvement, all federal 
agencies may be tasked to support the State’s response. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: These estimates are based on large urban exposure 
Casualties 2,375 casualties 
Infrastructure Damage 
Minimal, but building where attack 
occurs have to be destroyed 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons 
Evacuation and sheltering of 
approximately 3,000 may be required 
Contamination One building and contents 
Economic Impact 
$150 million to replace building 
Some businesses may never recover 
Potential for Multiple Events Moderate 
Recovery Timeline  
Weeks to years 
Some victims and businesses may 
never fully recover 
I. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. Nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly acting chemical warfare 
agents.  They are classified as Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD) by 
the United Nations. 
2. Symptoms of nerve agent poisoning include contractions of the pupils, 
convulsions and death by asphyxiation. 
B. Event Dynamics 
1. Two canister of Sarin nerve agent have been introduced into the air 
conditioning system of the tallest building in an urban area.  The actual 
release of the gas takes about 10 minutes. 
2. First responders will begin to arrive within 10 minutes of the initial call 
for assistance. 
3. Two hundred people are made ill as vapor is released throughout the 
ventilation system. 
4. Another 125 people, including first responders, have been affected by the 
gas. 
C. Secondary Hazards/Events 
1. People are being injured as they try to escape. 
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2. There will also be individuals that will present for medical care who 
incorrectly believe/fear that they have been impacted by the agent. 
II. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. Outside of the initial fatalities, a substantial number of people will experience 
chronic, on-going health problems related to Sarin exposure including permanent 
damage to the central nervous system.  Those who do survive usually recover in 4 
to 6 weeks but most will never completely recover. 
B. There will be little direct physical damage to the building but the building 
interiors and contents will be highly contaminated by the agent condensing on 
surfaces. 
C. The building may have to be destroyed and rebuilt.  Though the physical structure 
will not be impacted, some things cannot be decontaminated. 
D. It is probable many individuals and businesses would be reluctant to work in the 
building in the future because of the stigma of the attack. 
E. Some businesses may not recover from the attack.  Those that do will be 
significantly impacted by loss of staff and financial losses during the recovery 
period. 
III. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Initial Emergency Assessment 
1. First responders will arrive within 10 minutes of the initial call for help. 
2. Rapid and accurate assessment of the situation will be critical to the health 
and well-being of the first responders and the affected citizens. 
3. HAZMAT teams will be needed to assist in the initial response. 
B. Emergency Management/Response 
1. Dissemination of accurate, timely information will be critical to maintain 
public confidence and calm. 
2. Traffic and access control to the area will be an ongoing function until the 
total nature of the attack can be assessed. 
3. On-going access control will be necessary until decontamination/ 
destruction is completed. 
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C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident 
a. Law enforcement is charged with prevention of construction and 
detonation of WMDs. 
b. Citizens also have a role in prevention if they are aware of any 
efforts to obtain materials for or to construct such devices and 
should report such information to the law enforcement agencies. 




(1) Isolating and defining the hazard is one of the first steps in 
mitigating this type of attack as is establishing an Incident 
Command. 
(2) Gaining control of the infected population and preserving 
the scene for investigation are also important. 
b. Long-term 
There is little that can be done to mitigate a nerve agent 
attack except to try to prevent it. 
D. Public Protection 
1. Evacuation of downwind populations may be necessary. 
2. Accurate, timely information to the public will be essential. 
E. Victim Care 
1. Most victims will require hospital treatment and long term monitoring. 
2. Decontamination of survivors will also be required. 
3. Many victims as well as citizens in general may require mental health 
services. 
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F. Investigation/Apprehension 
Law enforcement and potentially the military will be involved in the 
investigation of the source of the nerve agent and the person or persons 
responsible for the construction and detonation of the delivery device. 
G. Recovery/Remediation 
1. Recovery will take years and cost millions of dollars. 
2. Some victims and businesses may never recover completely. 
3. The primary remediation will be prevention. 
IV. STATE RESPONSE 
A. Primary responsible agency is the South Carolina Department of Health and 
Environmental Control (SC DHEC). 
B. Secondary responsible agencies are South Carolina Emergency Management 
Division (SCEMD), South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) and all 
law enforcement units of state agencies. 
C. SERT Actions 
1. The State will activate the SC Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP) along 
with Appendix 9 (Catastrophic Incident Response Plan).  If it is 
determined to be an act of terrorism, the State will activate Appendix 8 
(Terrorism Operations Plan).  Activation of these plans will allow for lines 
of communication and necessary resource support to the affected counties. 
2. The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will immediately 
activate at OPCON 1. 
3. The SERT will make a recommendation to the Governor to declare a State 
of Emergency and to seek a Presidential Disaster Declaration. 
4. The response will begin with the activation of the Catastrophic Incident 
Response Plan (CIRP). 
5. Begin support activities between the counties and State. 
6. The SEOC will notify the SC Forestry Commission to activate a Type II 
Incident Management Team (IMT) and request a Type I Federal Incident 
Management Team. 
7. The SEOC will implement the appropriate EMAC agreements and begin 
assessment of additional needs. 
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8. All ESFs will activate to provide support to the affected counties 
Emergency Operations and Response Plans. 
9. The SEOC will notify FEMA Region IV. 
3. Establish the Unified Command Structure. 
10. The State will assist in the recovery, response, and mitigation of the event.  
11. State operations will be incorporated into a federal Joint Field Office 
(JFO) if established. 
D. Resources Available For Response 
1. The SEOC will serve as the Point of Contact for State resources. 
2. Resources available to respond include: 
 Firefighter Mobilization Act 
 S.C. National Guard 
 S.C. State Guard 
 Civil Support Team (CST) 
 SLED and SCDHEC WMD Teams 
 Incident Management Teams 
 Regional Medical Assistance Teams (RMAT) 
 SCDHEC mobile medical facilities 
 Federal Medical Facilities and related personnel  
 Strategic National Stockpile 
 Mutual Aid Agreements 
 All resources of state agencies 
V. ACTIONS BY ESF 
A. SCEMD will assist in developing and coordinating response plans and with GIS 
information. 
B. ESF 1 (Transportation) 
In coordination with ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) and the SC 
Department of Transportation (SCDOT), identify alternate routes; provide 
signage to avoid the impacted area and possible road closures downwind 
of the impact site.  
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C. ESF 3 (Public Works and Engineering) 
Public Works and Engineering are available through the SC Budget and 
Control Board to assist the affected counties in the clean-up and removal 
of possible contaminated debris. 
D. ESF4 (Firefighting) 
1. The SC Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation is available to 
provide additional firefighting and HAZMAT personnel to fight any 
related fires. 
2. Assist in HAZMAT clean-up and decontamination. 
E. ESF 6 (Mass Care) 
1. SCDSS in conjunction with the SC Department of Health and Human 
Services (SCDHHS) will assist The American Red Cross in sheltering the 
displaced population. 
2. Activate the Mass Shelter/Evacuation Plan. 
F. ESF 7 (Finance and Administration) 
The SC Budget and Control Board, Division of Procurement Services will 
provide the necessary support to purchase and distribute requested 
materials. 
G. ESF 8 (Health and Medical Services) 
1. SC DHEC will activate their Mass Casualty Plan, and make available 
mobile medical facilities as needed. 
2. Hospitals will be asked to activate their emergency plans. 
H. ESF 9 (Search and Rescue) 
The SC Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, Division of Life 
Safety will activate their SC Task Force 1 to assist in ongoing search and 
rescue requirements. 
I. ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) 
SCDHEC will activate their WMD Response Team to assist the affected 
counties in the identification and decontamination process. 
J. ESF 11 (Food Services) 
SCDSS will activate plans to provide food services to victims. 
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K. ESF 12 (Energy) 
Concerned energy providers will monitor the energy related infrastructure 
for possible impacts and restoration. 
L. ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) 
1. In conjunction with local law enforcement and railroad officials, SLED 
will conduct a criminal investigation. 
2. Law enforcement will assist in the evacuation and security of the overall 
incident scene. 
M. ESF 14 (Recovery and Mitigation) 
Coordinate with local and federal agencies to facilitate plans and programs 
for the recovery of the affected communities.  
N. ESF 15 (Public Information) 
1. In conjunction with local Public Information Officers, provide general 
incident information to include evacuation, sheltering, and the activation 
of the CODE RED system. 
O. ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) 
1. In conjunction with ESF 1 (Transportation) will provide for the 
redirection, exclusion and reentry of traffic for the affected area. 
2. Assist ESF 1 (Transportation) with traffic management. 
P. ESF 17 (Animal/Agriculture Emergency Response) 
Monitor possible animal exposure cases and provide support if required. 
Q. ESF 18 (Donated Goods and Volunteer Services) 
The SC Budget and Control Board, General Services Division will 
coordinate with Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) to 
provide services and donated goods to victims and facilitate recovery 
operations. 
R. ESF 19- Military Support 
1. The SC National Guard may be activated to provide possible evacuation 
and security as well as assistance to law enforcement. 
2. Activate the Civil Support Team. 
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VI. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
For an incident of this magnitude with possible terrorism involvement, all federal 
agencies may be tasked to support the State’s response. 
 
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX 9 (CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN) 
SCENARIO 8 - CHLORINE TANK EXPLOSION 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: These estimates are based on a large urban exposure 
Casualties 3,750 fatalities 
Infrastructure Damage 
Multiple buildings, a trestle and a 
section of road in immediate explosion 
area 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons 
Up to 10,000 (self-evacuate);  
5,000 will need assistance to evacuate 
Contamination At explosion site and waterways 
Economic Impact Millions 
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline  Weeks 
VII. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. Nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly acting chemical warfare 
agents.  They are classified as Weapons of Mass Destruction by the United 
Nations. 
2. Symptoms of nerve agent poisoning include contractions of the pupils, 
convulsions and death by asphyxiation. 
B. Event Dynamics 
1. Two canister of Sarin nerve agent have been introduced into the air 
conditioning system of the tallest building in an urban area. The actual 
release of the gas takes about 10 minutes. 
2. First responders will begin to arrive within 10 minutes of the initial call 
for assistance. 
3. Two hundred people are made ill as vapor is released throughout the 
ventilation system. 
4. Another 125 people, including first responders, have been affected by the 
gas. 
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VIII. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. Chlorine gas is used in many household cleaners and industries and is 
poisonous.  It has a pungent, irritating odor which smells like bleach.   
2. Chlorine gas is usually cooled and pressurized to change it from a gas to 
liquid form.  Once it is changed into a liquid form it can be stored and 
shipped to chemical, paper, and textile industries.  It is also used in sewage 
treatment plants. 
3. When the liquid form is released it quickly turns into a gas.  The gas is 
yellow-green in color and stays around ground level due to the density of 
the gas being greater than air.  The fact that it stays low to the ground 
increases the amount of time for exposure. 
4. Chlorine gas is not flammable alone, but if mixed with other chemicals 
such as ammonia, it can create compounds that will react explosively. 
5. Chlorine gas is one of the most common single, irritant, inhalation 
exposures that people come into contact with environmentally and 
occupationally.  Exposure can cause acute damage to the upper and lower 
respiratory tract. 
6. There is no antidote for chlorine poisoning, but chlorine’s effects are 
treatable.  Most people make a full recovery. 
7. In this scenario a section of railroad track has been tampered with causing 
a 10-car train to derail on a bridge in the middle of an urban area.  The 
train is carrying large quantities of liquid chlorine which is released into 
the air. 
B. Event Dynamics 
1. A train derails as it is crossing a bridge, and hits the busy city street below, 
crushing several motor vehicles. Immediately upon impact the train 
explodes. 
2. Five out of the ten train cars are carrying liquid chlorine. Almost 
simultaneously with the explosion of the train, comes the initial release of 
chlorine gas. 
3. All of the meteorological conditions are favorable for the attack to be 
successful. 
4. The plume of chlorine gas travels downwind from the site of the incident. 
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C. Secondary Hazards/Events 
1. Immediately after the train explosion, the population surrounding the 
incident site experience confusion.  The confusion is quickly followed by 
mass panic. 
2. Roughly 10% of the population will self-evacuate.  One fatality per 
10,000, of the population self-evacuating, are expected to occur. 
3. The three rivers running in and around the city will absorb the chlorine 
gas, creating hydrochloric acid.  Due to the high concentration of 
hydrochloric acid, acidic mists forms which have a corrosive effect on the 
human tissue. 
4. Downwind casualties and numerous injuries will occur. 
5. The area located downwind will be scattered with deceased animals and 
fish washed up on the banks of the rivers. 
IX. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. Approximately 150,000 people may be in the downwind area, which could extend 
as far as 20 miles. 
B. 7, 500 people will receive potentially lethal exposures, and half of these people 
will die. 
C. Another 22,500 will require hospitalization.  However, approximately 100,000 
people will seek treatment at local medical facilities. 
D. Major disruptions to healthcare and communications are expected to occur.  Local 
hospitals and medical facilities will be overwhelmed with the number of people 
seeking treatment for real or perceived injuries/illnesses. 
E. It will be difficult for individuals to contact their loved ones due to the huge 
increase in demand on the telephone landlines and nearby cell phone towers. 
F. In the midst of the mass hysteria, a couple hundred automobile accidents are 
expected to occur. 
G. A majority of the affected population will recover in 7 to 14 days, excluding those 
with severe lung damage. 
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X. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Initial Emergency Assessment 
1. Chlorine monitors that show actual levels of chlorine in the ambient air 
will be used at and around incident site to provide information and 
technical data about maximum concentrations of chlorine. 
2. Water sampling should also be conducted periodically throughout the 
areas downwind. 
3. Areas farther outside of the IDLH (Immediate Danger to Life and Health) 
should be included in this, because air outside an IDLH can still be at 
harmful levels, certainly with chronic exposure. 
4. Hazard Assessment/Analysis software tools should be used. 
a. OREIS is a software tool that provides responders with real-time 
information about the chemical contents of railcars and trucks 
involved in an incident, schematics for passenger railroads and a 
host of other life and time saving features. 
b. The ALOHA modeling program is another software tool 
responders could use to make at least an educated guess about how 
far away adverse effects of the chemical will be felt, as well as the 
infiltration of dwellings. 
B. Emergency Management/Response 
1. Activation of alert notification systems will be utilized.  The public will be 
notified by phone, and television and radio stations will broadcast alerts 
for public awareness. 
2. The State will activate the SC Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP) along 
with Appendix 9 (Catastrophic Incident Response Plan).  Activation of 
these plans will allow for lines of communication and necessary resource 
support to the affected counties. 
3. Local television and radio stations will also broadcast alerts to notify the 
public. 
4. Traffic and access control points will be activated. 
5. Resource support and requests for assistance will be managed and 
distributed as needed. 
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C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident. 
a. Pre-incident mitigation may prove difficult due to the nature of the 
incident. 
b. Transportation ordinances should be in place restricting 
transportation of hazardous materials through urban areas, time 
restrictions (ex. not allowing transportation during peak hours of 
the day), and zoning requirements mandating open space around 
hazardous transportation routes. 
2. Post-incident 
a. Short-term 
(1) The incident site will be isolated and responders will be 
decontaminated. 
(2) An evacuation of residents and commuters in the affected 
area will be required. 
(3) Downwind populations may be asked to shelter in place. 
b. Long-term 
(1) The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
conducted a study following the Graniteville, SC train 
collision which involved the release of chlorine gas. 
(2) NTSB found several factors that would mitigate future 
hazardous material spills involving tanker cars: 
(a) Increase the thickness of tanker cars. 
(b) Validate a predictive model that will quantify the 
dynamic forces acting on a tank car during an 
accident. 
(c) Develop and implement tank car design-specific 
fracture toughness standards for materials used to 
manufacture pressure tank cars. 
(d) The rear one-quarter of a train is the most desirable 
location for Hazardous Materials. 
(e) Reducing speed. 
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(f) Reducing the length of the train. 
D. Public Protection 
1. The will be a requirement for evacuation/and or sheltering of downwind 
populations. 
2. All unauthorized personnel will be kept away. 
3. People will be directed to stay upwind and out of low lying areas. 
4. There will be a need to immediately isolate the incident site for at least 
half mile in all directions. 
E. Victim Care 
1. Medical personnel will be notified of the chemical involved and take 
precautions to protect themselves. 
2. Local hospitals and medical facilities should expect patients to be treated 
for traumas from vehicular accidents, post-stress disorder, and/or for 
respiratory problems. 
3. Short-term as well as long-term care may be needed. 
4. The event is expected to overwhelm the local jurisdictions capabilities to 
treat victims.  With 10,000 severe injuries and approximately 23,000 
hospitalizations expected to occur during this particular catastrophic event, 
local hospitals and medical facilities will have an insufficient number of 
beds, medical equipment, and qualified medical personnel to assist in 
patient recovery. 
5. State and possibly federal assistance and resources will need to be utilized. 
6. Victims will be transported to surrounding county hospitals and medical 
facilities, or they may receive treatment in make-shift hospitals. 
7. The incident is estimated to cause approximately 10,000 casualties. 
F. Investigation/Apprehension 
Law enforcement will pursue a criminal investigation. 
G. Recovery/Remediation 
1. Actions of incident-site personnel include decontamination of 
contaminated areas, disposal of decontamination wastes, environmental 
testing, and public information activities. 
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2. Decontamination of waterways may present a significant challenge. 
3. Environmental impacts, especially public safety concerns, are likely to 
significantly delay rebuilding efforts. 
XI. STATE RESPONSE 
A. The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) is the 
primary agency tasked to respond to an incident site with hazardous materials. 
B. SC Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation is the secondary responsible 
agency tasked to respond to this incident. 
C. The State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) is a secondary responder tasked 
with providing quality manpower to law enforcement agencies, and to conduct 
criminal investigations on behalf of the State. 
D. South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD) will manage the 
State’s response. 
E. SERT Actions 
1. The State will activate the SC Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP) along 
with Appendix 9 (Catastrophic Incident Response Plan).  If it is an act of 
terrorism, the State will activate Appendix 8 (Terrorism Operations Plan).  
Activation of these plans will allow for lines of communication and 
necessary resource support to the affected counties. 
2. The SEOC will immediately activate at OPCON 2. 
3. The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) will make a 
recommendation to the Governor in reference to declaring a State of 
Emergency and requesting a Presidential Disaster Declaration. 
4. The response will begin with the activation of the Catastrophic Incident 
Response Plan (CIRP). 
5. The SEOC will begin support activities between the counties and State. 
6. The SEOC will notify the SC Forestry Commission to place a Type III 
Incident Management Team (IMT) on stand-by 
7. The SEOC will implement the appropriate EMAC agreements and begin 
assessment of additional needs. 
8. The following ESFs will activate: 3 (Public Works and Engineering), 4 
(Firefighting), 6 (Mass Care), 8 (Health and Medical Services), 10 
(Hazardous Materials), 13 (Law Enforcement), 15 (Public Information), 
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16 (Emergency Traffic Management), 17 (Animal/Agriculture Emergency 
Response), and 19 (Military Support) will provide support to the affected 
counties Emergency Operations and Response Plans.  Additional ESFs 
may activate as required to support the State’s response. 
9. The SEOC will notify FEMA Region IV. 
4. Establish the Unified Command Structure. 
5. The State will assist in the recovery, response, and mitigation of the event. 
10. Appropriate EMAC agreements will be implemented and assessment of 
additional needs will begin. 
11. The State will assist in the recovery, response, and mitigation to the event.  
12. State operations will be incorporated into a federal Joint Field Office 
(JFO) if established. 
F. Resources Available For Response 
1. The SEOC will serve as the point of contact for resource support from the 
state. 
2. Resources available to respond include but are not limited to 
I. Firefighter Mobilization Act  
II. S.C. National Guard 
III. S.C. State Guard 
IV. Civil Support Team (CST) 
V. SLED and SCDHEC WMD Teams 
VI. Incident Management Teams 
VII. Regional Medical Assistance Teams (RMAT) 
VIII. SCDHEC mobile medical facilities 
IX. Federal Medical Facilities and related personnel  
X. Strategic National Stockpile 
XI. Mutual Aid Agreements 
XII. All resources of state agencies 
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XII. ACTIONS BY ESF 
A. SCEMD will assist in developing and coordinating response plans and with GIS 
information. 
B. ESF 1 (Transportation) 
1. In coordination with ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) and the SC 
Department of Transportation (SCDOT), identify alternate routes, provide 
signage to avoid the impacted area, and repair damaged roadways. 
2. The railroad company will contact the National Response Center 
immediately following the incident as required by CERCLA 103 
(Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act). 
3. Coordinate with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and the owner 
of the tanker cars for repair and removal. 
C. ESF 3 (Public Works and Engineering) 
Public Works and Engineering are available through the SC Budget and 
Control Board to assist the affected counties in the clean-up and removal 
of debris. 
D. ESF4 (Firefighting) 
1. The SC Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation is available to 
provide additional firefighting and HAZMAT personnel to fight any 
related fires. 
2. Assist in HAZMAT clean-up and decontamination. 
E. ESF6 (Mass Care) 
1. The SC Department of Social Services (SCDSS) in conjunction with the 
SC Department of Health and Human Services (SCDHHS) will assist the 
American Red Cross in sheltering the displaced population. 
2. Activate their Mass Shelter/Evacuation Plan. 
F. ESF 8 (Health and Medical) 
1. SCDHEC will activate the Mass Casualty Plan, and make available mobile 
medical facilities as needed. 
2. Hospitals will be asked to activate their emergency plans. 
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G. ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) 
SCDHEC will activate their WMD Response Team to assist the affected 
counties in the identification and decontamination process. 
H. ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) 
1. In conjunction with local law enforcement and railroad officials, SLED 
will conduct a criminal investigation. 
2. Law enforcement will also assist in the evacuation and security of the 
overall incident scene. 
I. ESF 15 (Public Information) 
In conjunction with local Public Information Officers, provide general 
incident information to include evacuation, sheltering, and the activation 
of the CODE RED system. 
J. ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) 
Assist ESF 1 (Transportation) with traffic control management. 
K. ESF 17 (Animal/Agriculture Emergency Response) 
1. In conjunction with local animal control, identify and open shelters 
available for animal/livestock. 
2. Clemson University Livestock and Poultry Health (CULPH) has legal 
jurisdiction over most animal related situations dealing with emergency or 
disaster scenarios. 
L. ESF 19 (Military Support) 
1. The SC National Guard will be alerted to provide possible evacuation and 
security, as well as assistance to law enforcement. 
2. Activate the CST. 
XIII. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
Federal agencies available to assist in the response may include: 
 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
 Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) 
 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
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 Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
 
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX 9 (CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN) 
SCENARIO 11 - RADIOLOGICAL ATTACK –  
RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES 
SCCIRP 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
Casualties 140 Casualties 
Infrastructure Damage Moderate to blast area 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons Yes, potentially 20,000 
Contamination 
Detectable contamination found in over 
50 buildings and on 4 major roads 
including part of an interstate highway. 
Economic Impact Millions 
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline  Years 
I. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. A Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) is detonated in an open park area 
on a weekend evening killing 140 and injuring over 100. 
2. Over 2,000 citizens received detectable to acute radiation exposure.  
3. Dozens of others are injured in the rush to leave the detonation area and 
are in subsequent automobile accidents as citizens evacuated the area. 
4. The resulting plume carried by prevailing east winds carries contamination 
over a two mile area including a major metropolitan business area. 
5. Fifty buildings are contaminated through intake air systems and four major 
roads and numerous subsidiary streets are contaminated. 
B. Event Dynamics 
1. The explosion is instantaneous and the plume dispersion continues for 20 
minutes. 
2. First responders do not recognize radioactive contamination immediately 
and information on containment is delayed. 
3. Many who were exposed at the blast site are moving throughout the local 
area in the panic following the blast. 
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4. Many in the downwind area are exposed before they are notified to 
evacuate. 
C. Secondary Hazards/Events 
1. Several small fires erupt as the result of broken gas lines in the area. 
2. Human remains present a biohazard and some are very radioactive. 
3. There will be individuals that will present for medical care who 
incorrectly believe/fear they have been impacted by the agent. 
II. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. Radioactive contamination is present on both the inside and outside of buildings 
in a two mile area and there may be minor contamination further downwind as 
investigators perform more thorough surveys. 
B. Long term decontamination efforts will be successful but these efforts may 
include the destruction of some buildings. 
C. Many square blocks of the metropolitan area will not be available for business or 
citizen use for a number of years. 
D. Decontamination, destruction, disposal and reconstruction will cost millions of 
dollars. 
E. Although many of the businesses affected will be able to set up at alternate 
locations, the event will have a tremendous, negative impact on the business 
operations and the economy of the state. 
F. No one will suffer long term, acute radiation syndrome but there will most likely 
be a notable increase in life cancer risk for the affected population. 
G. Mental health services should be required at a higher level than would normally 
be found in populations not subject to an RDD attack. 
III. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Initial Emergency Assessment 
1. First responders are likely to be contaminated. 
2. The plume disbursement will be a significant component. 
3. Initial panic and rumor control will need to be dealt with efficiently and 
effectively. 
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B. Emergency Management/Response 
1. First responders will be exposed and will need access to decontamination. 
2. The sites impacted by the direct blast and the plume dissipation will need 
to be identified and a security perimeter established including roads and 
highways. 
3. Incident command will be established. 
4. Dissemination of accurate, timely information will be critical to maintain 
public confidence and calm. 
C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident 
a. Law enforcement is charged with prevention and detonation of 
RDDs. 
b. Citizens have a role in prevention in reporting information to law 
enforcement agencies if they are aware of any efforts to obtain 
materials for or to construct such devises. 
2. Post-incident 
a. Short-term 
(1) Isolating and defining the hazard is one of the first steps in 
mitigating this type of attack as is establishing an incident 
command. 
(2) Preserving the scene for investigation is also important. 
b. Long-term.  There is little that can be done to mitigate a RDD 
attack other than attempting to prevent it. 
D. Public Protection 
1. Citizens will be evacuated and sheltered if necessary. 
2. Pharmaceuticals such as oral Potassium Iodide (KI) will need to be 
distributed. 
3. Accurate, timely public information on decontamination sites, appropriate 
actions and expectations can limit the spread of contamination and 
empower citizens to act appropriately. 
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E. Victim Care 
1. Injured people will require some decontamination in the course of medical 
treatment. 
2. Thousand more will likely need superficial decontamination and both long 
and short-term medical follow-up. 
3. Many victims will require varying degrees of mental health services. 
F. Investigation/Apprehension 
Law enforcement, and potentially the military, will be involved in the 
investigation of the source of the radioactive agent and the person or 
persons responsible for the construction and detonation of the delivery 
device. 
G. Recovery/Remediation 
1. Recovery will take years and cost millions of dollars. 
2. Some victims and businesses may never recover completely. 
3. The primary remediation is prevention. 
IV. STATE RESPONSE 
A. Primary responsible agency is the SC Department of Health and Environmental 
Control (SCDHEC) 
B. Secondary responsible agencies are South Carolina Emergency Management 
Division (SCEMD), South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) and all 
law enforcement units of state agencies. 
C. SERT Actions 
3. The State will activate the SC Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP) along 
with Appendix 9 (Catastrophic Incident Response Plan) and Appendix 8 
(Terrorism Operations Plan).  Activation of these plans will allow for lines 
of communication and necessary resource support to the affected counties. 
4. The SEOC will activate at OPCON 2. 
5. The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) will make a 
recommendation to the Governor in reference to declaring a State of 
Emergency and requesting a Presidential Disaster Declaration. 
6. The response will begin with the activation of the Catastrophic Incident 
Response Plan (CIRP). 
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7. The SEOC will begin support activities between the counties and the 
State. 
8. The SEOC will notify the SC Forestry Commission to activate a Type II 
Incident Management Team (IMT) on standby. 
9. The SEOC will implement the appropriate EMAC agreements and begin 
assessment of additional needs. 
10. The following ESFs will activate: 1 (Transportation), 3 (Public Works and 
Engineering), 4 (Firefighting), 6 (Mass Care), 8 (Health and Medical 
Services), 10 (Hazardous Materials), 13 (Law Enforcement), 15 (Public 
Information), 16 (Emergency Traffic Management), 19 (Military Support), 
and 24 (Business and Industry).  Additional ESFs may activate as required 
to support the State’s response. 
11. The SEOC will notify FEMA Region IV. 
12. Establish the Unified Command Structure. 
13. The State will assist in the recovery, response, and mitigation of the event.  
14. State operations will be incorporated into a federal Joint Field Office 
(JFO) if established. 
D. Resources Available For Response: 
1. The SEOC will serve as the Point of Contact for resource support from the 
State. 
2. Resources available to respond include but are not limited to: 
 Firefighter Mobilization Act 
 S.C. National Guard 
 S.C. State Guard 
 Civil Support Team (CST) 
 SLED and SCDHEC WMD Teams 
 Incident Management Teams 
 Regional Medical Assistance Teams (RMAT) 
 SCDHEC mobile medical facilities 
 Federal Medical Facilities and related personnel  
 Strategic National Stockpile 
 Mutual Aid Agreements 
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 All resources of state agencies 
V. ACTIONS BY ESF: 
A. ESF 1 (Transportation) 
In conjunction with ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) and the SC 
Department of Transportation (SCDOT), identify alternate routes, provide 
signage to avoid the impacted area, and repair damaged roadways and 
bridges. 
B. ESF 3 (Public Works and Engineering) 
Public Works and Engineering are available through the SC Budget and 
Control Board to assist the affected county/counties in the clean-up and 
removal of contaminated debris. 
C. ESF4 (Firefighting) 
1. The SC Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation is available to 
provide additional firefighting and HAZMAT personnel. 
2. Assist in HAZMAT clean-up and decontamination. 
D. ESF 6 (Mass Care) 
1. SCDSS in conjunction with the SC Department of Health and Human 
Services (SCDHHS) will assist The American Red Cross in sheltering the 
displaced population. 
2. Activate the Mass Shelter/Evacuation Plan. 
E. ESF 8 (Health and Medical) 
1. SCDHEC will activate their Mass Casualty Plan, and make available 
mobile medical facilities as needed. 
2. Hospitals will activate their emergency plans. 
F. ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) 
SCDHEC will activate their WMD Response Team to assist the affected 
county/counties in the identification and decontamination process. 
G. ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) 
1. In conjunction with local law enforcement and railroad officials, SLED 
will conduct a criminal investigation. 
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2. Law enforcement will assist in the evacuation and security of the overall 
incident scene. 
H. ESF 15 (Public Information) 
1. In conjunction with local Public Information Officers, provide general 
incident information to include evacuation, sheltering, and the activation 
of the CODE RED system. 
I. ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) 
Assist ESF 1 (Transportation) with traffic control management. 
J. ESF 19 (Military Support) 
1. The SC National Guard may be alerted to provide possible evacuation and 
security as well as assistance to law enforcement. 
2. Activate the CST. 
K. ESF 24 (Business and Industry) 
The SC Department of Commerce will seek to work with displaced 
businesses to restore their operations at non-contaminated locations. 
VI. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
A. Federal agencies available to assist in the response may include: 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
 Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
B. If the event is determined to involve terrorism, any and all federal agencies may 
be tasked to respond to support the State’s response. 
 
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX 9 (CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN) 
SCENARIO 12 - EXPLOSIVES ATTACK –  
BOMBING USING IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
Casualties 200 fatalities 
Infrastructure Damage 
Several structures affected by blast and 
fire 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons Minimal 
Contamination None 
Economic Impact Millions  
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline Months  
I. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are used in asymmetrical warfare.  
They may incorporate military or commercially-sourced explosives (many 
times the two are combined) or even home-made explosives. 
2. IEDs typically consist of an explosive charge, a detonator, and an 
initiation system. 
3. IEDS fall into three categories: 
a. Package Type 
(1) Package type IEDS can be command detonated (either by 
wire or remote device) or time-delayed. 
(2) There are many ways that package type IEDS can be used.  
They can be thrown from overpasses, and from the roadside 
in front of approaching vehicles, placed in potholes covered 
with dirt, and the list goes on. 
b. Vehicle-Borne 
(1) Vehicle-borne IEDS are devices that use the vehicle as the 
container or package of the device. 
(2) One vehicle or multiple vehicles and anything from small 
sedans to large cargo trucks may be used. 
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(3) When multiple vehicles are involved, the lead vehicle is 
usually used as a decoy or barrier buster. 
c. Suicide Bomb 
(1) A Suicide Bomb IED is a “person-borne” bomb.  The main 
goal of a suicide bomber is not to commit suicide, but to 
inflict as much bodily harm or kill as many people as 
possible. 
(2) Explosives with fragmentation can be concealed in clothing 
that has been modified to carry this material. 
B. Event Dynamics 
1. Two large vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attacks occur in an urban area of 
the State. 
2. The two VBIEDs are disguised as EMS vehicles. 
3. The first attack occurs when a VBIED detonates in the first level of a 
packed college stadium. 
4. A second attack occurs a mile or two away from the first attack at the 
State Fair Grounds. 
C. Secondary Hazards/Events 
1. Significant structural damage to the stadium and minor structural damage 
to a few surrounding buildings occurs as a result of the explosion. 
2. After the blast, a portion of the stadium collapses. 
3. Spectators panic and immediately evacuate the stadium. 
4. When the second bomb detonates the panic and chaos increase.  Victims 
trying to flee the scene as quickly as possible will cause many traffic 
accidents. 
5. There may be toxic smoke resulting from fires and explosions. 
6. Electrical power, natural gas lines, and water mains will be disrupted. 
7. There will also be a loss of traffic control in the area. 
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II. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. The attacks result in a total of 200 fatalities. 
1. Motor-vehicle accidents account for 10 fatalities. 
2. Another 70 casualties occur from falling or being crushed during the 
pandemonium when people are evacuating the stadium and the fair 
grounds. 
3. The remaining fatalities were either a direct result of the explosion or the 
subsequent collapse of structures. 
B. Although emergency service workers and firefighters were beginning to arrive on 
scene of the first incident when the second incident occurred, none of them were 
injured. 
C. There were approximately 800 injuries, but half of them were minor scrapes and 
cuts.  The other half had injuries that were severe enough to require 
hospitalization.   
III. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Initial Emergency Assessment 
1. Immediately following the first explosion, the incident is recognized as an 
attack. 
2. After the attack, incident-site personnel will detect the agent, conduct 
hazard assessment, predict likely outcomes, and continue to monitor the 
situation. 
B. Emergency Management/Response 
1. The attacks will require mutual aid between fire, law enforcement, EMS, 
and other responders. 
2. Urban Search and Rescue Teams will be activated. 
3. The county in which the incidents occur will activate its Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) along with the State Emergency Operations 
Center (SEOC). 
4. The public will be informed of the attacks via activation of notification 
systems and the media. 
5. The two incident-sites will be isolated and traffic and access control points 
will be established and manned. 
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6. The SEOC and county EOC will coordinate resource support and requests 
for assistance. 
7. The incident sites will be preserved as a crime scene. 
C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident 
a. Due to the nature of an IED, mitigation methods may prove 
difficult. 
b. Proximity restrictions near or around critical facilities and large 
venues may reduce the impact. 
c. Proper training of personnel in the identification of suspicious 
vehicles and packages may decrease risk. 
2. Post-incident: 
a. Short-term 
(1) Mitigation measures will be complicated by secondary 
device concerns (i.e., delayed detonation of IEDs). 
(2) After the attack, incident-site personnel must isolate and 
define the hazard; establish, plan, and operate incident 
command; fight fires; conduct bomb disposal dispatch and 
IED render-safe procedures. 
(3) Bomb disposal units should perform inspections of all 
surrounding vehicles. 
b. Long-term.  Maintain training and increase security. 
D. Public Protection 
1. Additional evacuations may occur and additional threat assessments 
should be conducted of other likely targets for additional attacks. 
2. Public facilities should increase security and restrictions should be 
established. 
3. Barriers should be set up around the incident and the surrounding area to 
maintain security.  
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E. Victim Care 
1. As soon as responders are on-scene, victims will be triaged and their 
treatment will be prioritized. 
2. Injuries will range from minor cuts and bruises to severe trauma. 
3. Local hospitals in the area will be overwhelmed and patients will have to 
be transported to hospitals in other counties. 
F. Investigation/Apprehension 
1. Law enforcement will work with the appropriate Federal Agencies to 
conduct a criminal investigation. 
2. The investigation can begin during the rescue phase with photo 
documentation of the immediate scenes, victim locations, and injury 
patterns. 
G. Recovery/Remediation 
1. Significant clean-up of both incident sites will be needed. 
2. After evidence search and recovery has been completed, the debris will 
need to be removed and disposed of. 
3. Repair and restoration of the stadium and surrounding buildings will take 
over a year. 
IV. STATE RESPONSE 
A. The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) will be the primary state 
agency to respond to this event. 
B. South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD), SC Department of 
Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) and SC Department of Labor, 
Licensing and Regulation (SCLLR) will be secondary agencies. 
C. SERT Actions 
1. The State will activate the SC Emergency Operations Plan (SCEOP) along 
with Appendix 9 (Catastrophic Incident Response Plan).  If it is 
determined to be an act of terrorism, the State will activate Appendix 8 
(Terrorism Operations Plan).  Activation of these plans will allow for lines 
of communication and necessary resource support to the affected counties. 
2. The SEOC will immediately activate at OPCON 2. 
3. The SEOC will begin support activities between the county and the State. 
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4. The SEOC will notify the SC Forestry Commission to activate a Type II 
Incident Management Team (IMT) on standby. 
5. Appropriate EMAC agreements will be implemented and assessment of 
additional needs will begin. 
6. The following ESFs will activate: 1 (Transportation), 3 (Public Works and 
Engineering), 4 (Firefighting), 8 (Health and Medical Services), 10 
(Hazardous Materials), 13 (Law Enforcement), 15 (Public Information), 
16 (Emergency Traffic Management), and 19 (Military Support), and 24 
(Business and Industry).  Additional ESFs may activate as required to 
support the State’s response. 
7. The SEOC will notify FEMA Region IV. 
8. Establish the Unified Command Structure. 
9. The State will assist in the recovery, response, and mitigation of the event.  
10. State operations will be incorporated into a federal Joint Operations Center 
(JOC) if established. 
D. Resources Available For Response 
1. The SEOC will serve as the Point of Contact for resource support from the 
State. 
2. Resources available to respond include but are not limited to: 
 Firefighter Mobilization Act 
 S.C. National Guard 
 S.C. State Guard 
 Civil Support Team (CST) 
 SLED and SCDHEC WMD Teams 
 Incident Management Teams 
 Regional Medical Assistance Teams (RMAT) 
 SCDHEC mobile medical facilities 
 Federal Medical Facilities and related personnel 
 Mutual Aid Agreements 
 All resources of state agencies. 
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V. ACTIONS BY ESF 
A. ESF 1 (Transportation) 
In coordination with ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management), the SC 
Department of Transportation (SCDOT) will identify alternate routes, 
provide signage to avoid the impacted area, and repair damaged roadways. 
B. ESF 3 (Public Works and Engineering) 
Public Works and Engineering assets are available through the SC Budget 
and Control Board to assist the affected counties in the clean-up and 
removal of contaminated debris. 
C. ESF4  (Firefighting) 
The SCLLR, Division of Fire and Life Safety is available to provide 
additional firefighting and Search and Rescue personnel. 
D. ESF 8 (Health and Medical) 
SCDHEC will activate the Mass Casualty Plan, and make available mobile 
medical facilities as needed.  Hospitals will also be asked to activate their 
emergency plans. 
E. ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) 
SCDHEC will activate their WMD Response Team to assist the affected 
counties in the identification and investigation of the event. 
F. ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) 
SLED will lead the investigation of the event. 
G. ESF 15 (Public Information) 
In conjunction with local Public Information Officers, provide general 
incident information and the activation of the CODE RED system. 
H. ESF 16 (Emergency Traffic Management) 
In conjunction with ESF 1 (Transportation), redirect traffic, provide 
security, and restrict access.  
I. ESF 24 (Business and Industry) 
The SC Department of Commerce will seek to work with displaced 
businesses to restore their operations at undamaged locations.  
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VI. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
A. Federal agencies available to assist in the response may include: 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
 Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
B. If the event is determined to involve terrorism any and all federal agencies may be 
tasked to respond. 
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SCENARIO 13 - BIOLOGICAL ATTACK –  
FOOD CONTAMINATION 
SCCIRP 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
Casualties 300 fatalities 
Infrastructure Damage None 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons None 
Contamination 
Sites where contamination was 
dispersed 
Economic Impact Millions  
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline Weeks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The policy of the State of South Carolina is to be prepared for any emergency or 
disaster. 
B. Emergency response personnel, equipment, and facilities will maintain a state of 
readiness to save lives, prevent or minimize damage to property, and provide 
assistance to all who are threatened by an emergency or become victims of a 
disaster. 
II. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. Food contamination is the presence of a harmful or objectionable foreign 
substance that is introduced into a food supply before, during, or after 
processing or storage.  In a biological attack, food contamination can be 
used for the specific purpose of causing injury or death to the civilian 
populations and/or disrupting social, political, or economic stability.  The 
biological agents could be communicably infectious or non-infectious 
pathogenic microorganisms, including viruses, bacteria, and parasites. 
2. There have been many instances in history where the civilian food supply 
has been deliberately sabotaged.  This can be by putting harmful 
biological agents in the food during the packaging process so it is shipped 
to grocery stores all over the United States or the world, or by introducing 
a harmful biological agent to livestock or the food that they eat.   
3. Symptoms of a food borne illness typically begin several hours to several 
days after consumption.  Depending on the agent involved, the consumer 
may have nausea, abdominal pain, diarrhea, vomiting, gastroenteritis, 
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fever, fatigue, and /or a headache.  In most cases those infected make a 
full recovery.  However, in some cases it can cause permanent health 
problems or even death for high-risk populations such as young children, 
babies, pregnant women, and the elderly. 
4. In this scenario, an urban area of the state is exposed to contaminated 
poultry.  The meat is contaminated with liquid anthrax. Subsequently the 
contaminated poultry is shipped out to grocery stores around the state.  
Many people become seriously ill or die as a result of consuming the 
tainted poultry. 
B. Event Dynamics 
1. Local hospitals see a sudden influx of patients with gastrointestinal 
symptoms.  Roughly 10 days after the initial influx begins, 1,000 people 
have become ill and 200 have died.  Doctors are unable to identify the 
illness, so the CDC becomes involved. 
2. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection 
Service, Heath and Human Services (HHS), and the Federal Drug 
Administration (FDA) pursue epidemiological investigations.  Autopsies 
performed on victims indicate intestinal anthrax. 
3. Hospitals around the State are inundated with ill people suffering the same 
severe gastrointestinal symptoms, and the contaminated products are 
traced back to a poultry production plant.  The affected plant is closed and 
decontaminated. 
4. A criminal investigation is initiated. 
C. Secondary Hazards/Events 
1. The general public becomes extremely concerned, resulting in hospitals 
around the state being swarmed with ill people and people that are fearful 
of becoming ill. 
2. Medical facilities are overwhelmed.  The public floods into medical 
facilities seeking prescription drugs to prevent or recover from sickness. 
3. The public fear causes poultry sales to plummet and many workers in the 
poultry industry lose their jobs. 
4. Additional cases may arise from frozen chicken used after the initial 
incident. 
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III. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. The attack results in a total of 300 fatalities, 500 hospitalizations, and 1,400 
illnesses. 
B. The only property damaged is the poultry plant, and damage is minimal due only 
to contamination. 
C. Moderate disruption occurs in other food industries due to the public's concern 
about food safety in general. 
D. The general public’s concern will mostly likely have a long-term financial impact, 
and they will demand that extra measures are taken to assure the safety of the 
food supply. 
IV. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Initial Emergency Assessment 
The cause of illness must be determined and the contamination source must be 
tracked. 
B. Initial Emergency Response 
Decisions regarding population protective measures will be needed.  Public 
notification and alert systems should be activated.  The public should be informed 
and educated about the attack.   
C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident: Background checks must be performed on all employees.  
Video cameras should be installed. 
2. Post-incident: 
a. Short-term.  Once the source of contamination is determined, 
consumption of the product should be halted. 
b. Long-term.  Due to the nature of the incident, long term mitigation 
may prove difficult. 
D. Public Protection 
1. The public will be alerted of the incident. 
2. They will be provided with information and education. 
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E. Victim Care 
Victim care will require diagnosis and treatment of affected population and 
distribution of prophylaxis for potentially exposed populations. 
F. Investigation/Apprehension 
1. Epidemiology will be critical to trace the source of contamination. 
2. Investigation of the crime and apprehension of the suspect will be needed. 
G. Remediation 
1. The poultry plant will need to be decontaminated. 
2. Contaminated food will require disposal. 
V. STATE RESPONSE 
A. The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) is the 
primary state agency tasked to respond.  
B. South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD), South Carolina Law 
Enforcement Division (SLED), and Clemson University Livestock and Poultry 
Health (CULPH) are designated as secondary agencies for response. 
C. SERT Actions 
1. SCEMD will initially increase its response posture to support the affected 
jurisdiction.  State resources will be made available assist in response, 
recovery and mitigation to the event. 
2. The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will immediately 
activate at OPCON 4. 
3. The Governor may activate State Mitigation Plan.  
4. Support activities between the counties and State begin. 
5. ESFs 4, 6, 8, 10, 13, 15, 17 and 24 will be activated to support state 
response.  Other ESFs may be activated if investigations determine 
terrorist activity. 
6. If necessary, the State may implement EMAC agreements once 
assessment of additional needs begins. 
7. FEMA Region IV notified. 
8. The Unified Command Structure established. 
Catastrophic Incident Response Plan 
SCCIRP 
Appendix 9-D-13-5 15 April 2015 
D. Resources Available For Responses 
1. The SEOC will serve as the point of contact for resource support from the 
state. 
2. Resources available to respond include but are not limited to: 
 Firefighter Mobilization Act  
 S.C. National Guard 
 S.C. State Guard 
 Civil Support Team (CST) 
 SLED and SCDHEC WMD Teams 
 Incident Management Teams 
 Regional Medical Assistance Teams (RMAT) 
 SCDHEC mobile medical facilities 
 Federal Medical Facilities and related personnel  
 Strategic National Stockpile 
 Mutual Aid Agreements 
 All resources of state agencies 
VI. ACTIONS BY ESF 
A. ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) 
1. SLED will lead the law enforcement response to include quarantine 
enforcement, investigation and prevention of subsequent contaminations. 
2. SLED will coordinate with federal law enforcement agencies involved 
with the response. 
B. ESF 4 (Firefighting) 
The SC Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation is available to provide 
through the Firefighter Mobilization Act, HAZMAT personnel to assist in the 
decontamination of the contamination site. 
C. ESF 8 (Health and Medical Services) 
1. SCDHEC will activate the Mass Casualty Plan and advise area hospitals to 
activate emergency operations plans. 
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2. SCDHEC will make available their Mobile Medical Facilities to 
accommodate additional victims. 
D. ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) 
SCDHEC will activate their WMD Response Team to assist the affected county in 
the identification and decontamination process. 
A. ESF 15–Public Information 
ESF 15 will coordinate with local PIO officials to provide general incident 
information to include general disease information and updates on efforts to 
control the spread of exposed food products. 
B. ESF 17–Animal Emergency Response 
1. CULPH will coordinate with federal officials to test for additional poultry 
processing plants for contamination. 
2. CULPH will quarantine poultry and make recommendations to state 
officials to limit exposure. 
C. ESF 24–Business and Industry 
The SC Department of Commerce will coordinate with industry representatives to 
mitigate the business impact and expedite the recovery of lost production and 
employment. 
V. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
A. The Federal agencies that will be tasked to respond include: 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
 Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
 USDA 
B. Other federal agencies may be tasked if terrorism is determined thorough 
investigation. 
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SCENARIO 14 - BIOLOGICAL ATTACK - 
FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE (FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE) 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
Casualties None 
Infrastructure Damage Significant loss of livestock 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons None 
Contamination None 
Economic Impact Millions  
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline Months 
I. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is a severe and highly communicable 
Foreign Animal Disease caused by a virus.  The virus can persist in 
contaminated animal food and the environment for up to one month.  It 
affects cattle, swine, sheep, goats, deer, and other cloven-hooved animals. 
2. FMD can be spread by people, animals, or materials that bring the virus 
into physical contact with susceptible animals. 
3. The disease causes fever and blister-like lesions followed by eruptions on 
the tongue and lips and between the hooves. 
4. Pregnant animals often abort and dairy cattle may dry up.  It spreads 
rapidly among such animals and can be fatal in young animals. 
5. The disease is not considered a human threat. 
6. The United States has not had an outbreak of FMD since 1929.  However, 
if the U.S. were to have another outbreak, it could cripple the agricultural 
industry and have severe effects on the economy. 
B. Event Dynamics 
1. In this scenario, perpetrators infect farm animals at several specific 
locations around the State simultaneously.  One of the locations is a 
livestock transportation node where they contaminate an animal shipment.  
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2. A farmer in South Carolina notices some of his animals are sick and calls 
a veterinarian.  The veterinarian is unsure of his diagnosis and contacts 
State Animal Health authorities. 
3. The next day, the State Animal Health authorities send a Foreign Animal 
Disease (FAD) diagnostician to the farm.  The diagnostician becomes 
suspicious of a possible contagious FAD and sends samples to the FAD 
Diagnostic Laboratory. 
4. The same day the samples are sent to the lab, the diagnostician places the 
farm under quarantine as a precautionary measure.  This process continues 
to happen with other farms within the state and a some farms in 
surrounding states. 
5. The results from the samples come back positive.  In response, the sites 
are quarantined, decontaminated, and herds are destroyed. 
6. These events all occur within 5 days of the first known outbreak. 
C. Secondary Hazards/Events 
1. Environmental issues pertaining to contaminated land and equipment will 
arise. 
2. Disposal of carcasses of culled animals must be done in an 
environmentally conscious way. 
3. A widespread animal disease will not hurt humans but could have 
psychological effects. 
II. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. There are no human fatalities or injuries. 
B. Massive numbers of affected livestock are disposed of because the United States 
has a national policy not to vaccinate. 
C. Long-term effects will be on trade and the retail industry will suffer due to the 
false perception that one can contract a FAD. 
D. Livestock transportation into and out of affected areas will be disrupted. 
E. Movement will be limited in order to prevent further spread. 
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III. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Emergency Assessment 
Investigations using epidemiological trace-back, microbial forensics, and 
other approaches will be used to determine the source of the agent and 
identity of the perpetrators. 
B. Initial Emergency Response 
1. There will be central coordination between the State of South Carolina and 
other states that have experienced an outbreak. 
2. The Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group system and other 
established national crisis managements systems will be utilized to 
communicate effectively with each other and successfully allocate 
resources. 
3. South Carolina and other states involved will emphasize the need for 
containment. 
4. The public should be well informed of the threat and impact of the disease 
to lessen their fear. 
C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident 
a) Due to the nature of the event, hazard mitigation may prove 
difficult. 
b) Limiting the number of cattle in geographical regions may reduce 
the contamination of large quantities of livestock. 
c) Clearly identified trade routes will allow investigators to more 
easily predict future outbreaks. 
2. Post-incident 
a) Short-term 
(1) A stop movement order could halt the move of susceptible 
animals (and of conveyances and animals in transit, among 
other things) if considered by authorities. 
(2) The specific parameters of the stop movement, the duration 
of the stoppage, how it would be enforced, and the 
economic implications of the stoppage will be assessed 
based on the extent of the outbreak. 
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(3) Livestock should be quickly identified and properly 
destroyed. 
b) Long-term 
(1) Equitable indemnification and when to begin reconstitution 
of the herds to begin economic recovery will be a major 
consideration. 
(2) The public should be well informed to prevent the long-
term effects on trade and the retail industry. 
D. Public Protection 
The public should be well informed of the threat and impact of the disease 
to the human population. 
E. Victim Care 
Infected and exposed animals will be euthanized and then disposed of. 
F. Investigation/Apprehension 
Investigation and apprehension will involve the pursuit of a criminal 
investigation involving law enforcement and agricultural experts. 
G. Recovery/Remediation 
1. Farms, feedlots, and any transportation nodes carrying the infected cattle 
will need to be decontaminated. 
2. Any materials or tools exposed to the disease should be disinfected.   
IV. STATE RESPONSE 
A. Clemson University Livestock and Poultry Health (CULPH)) is the primary State 
agency. 
B. Secondary responsible agencies are South Carolina Emergency Management 
Division (SCEMD), South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) and 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). 
C. SERT Actions 
1. SCEMD will initially increase its response posture to support the affected 
jurisdiction. 
2. State resources will be made available to assist in the response, recovery 
and mitigation of the event.  
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3. The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will activate at OPCON 
4. 
4. The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) may recommend the 
Governor activate the State Mitigation Plan. 
5. Begin support activities between the counties and the State. 
6. The following ESFs will activate: 4 (Firefighting), 6 (Mass Care), 8 
(Health and Medical Services), 10 (Hazardous Materials), 13 (Law 
Enforcement), 15 (Public Information), 17 (Animal/Agriculture 
Emergency Response), and 24 (Business and Industry).  Additional ESFs 
may activate as required to support the State’s response. 
7. The SEOC will implement the appropriate EMAC agreements and begin 
assessment of additional needs. 
8. The SEOC will notify FEMA Region IV. 
9. Establish the Unified Command Structure. 
D. Resources Available For Responses 
1. The SEOC will serve as the Point of Contact for resource support from the 
State. 
2. The primary resource will be the staff of Clemson University with some 
support from the SC Department of Agriculture and SCDHEC. 
V. ACTIONS BY ESF 
A. ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) 
1. SCDHEC will activate teams and assets to assist in the local 
decontamination process. 
B. ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) 
1. The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) will lead the law 
enforcement response to include quarantine enforcement, investigation 
and prevention of subsequent contaminations. 
2. SLED will liaise with federal law enforcement agencies involved with the 
response. 
C. ESF 15 (Public Information) 
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Coordinate with local PIO officials to provide general incident 
information to include general disease information and updates in an effort 
to minimize public concerns and ensure accurate information. 
D. ESF 17 (Animal Emergency Response) 
1. CULPH will coordinate with federal officials to test subsequent, potential 
outbreaks. 
2. CULPH will oversee the destruction of herds and disposal of remains. 
E. ESF 24 (Business and Industry) 
The SC Department of Commerce will coordinate with industry 
representatives to mitigate the business impact and expedite the recovery 
of lost production and employment. 
VI. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
A. The Federal agencies tasked to respond include the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), The Center for Disease Control (CDC), and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
B. Other Federal agencies may be tasked if the investigation determines the event 
resulted from terrorism. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
Casualties None directly 
Infrastructure Damage Water; possibly Chemical Sector 
Evacuations/Displaced Persons Yes 
Contamination Yes; HAZMAT 
Economic Impact Millions  
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline Months 
VII. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
A. General Description 
1. SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems are relied on 
heavily within various critical infrastructure sectors to manage industrial 
process controls over geographically dispersed continuous distribution 
operations. 
2. These process and control systems are subject to serious damage and 
disruption by cyber attack due to their standardization and connectivity to 
other networks. 
3. A cyber based attack on the SCADA or process control system used to 
control, regulate, and monitor a water system can significantly degrade the 
system’s performance and negatively impact public health and safety. 
4. Many of our national critical infrastructure sectors are dependent on water 
and wastewater systems. Loss of water supply or wastewater treatment 
capability can create negative cascading effects that impact other sectors 
of US critical infrastructure. 
B. Event Dynamics 
1. Networked control systems are increasingly being deployed to facilitate 
the monitoring and control of geographically dispersed physical 
infrastructures. Since the late 1990’s, there has been a dedicated effort 
throughout various critical infrastructure sectors to replace traditional 
hard-wired electromechanical devices with Internet-connected embedded 
devices. 
2. In this scenario, cyber threat actors obtain unauthorized access to the 
corporate network of a software development firm.  This firm is a 
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contractor that has been retained to update the existing SCADA system 
software at a medium sized municipal water supply and wastewater 
treatment facility.  This facility provides both services to approximately 
170,000 customers located throughout the county. 
3. The contractor has administrative credentials to the water company’s 
network so that they can perform the software updates.  The threat actors 
access this information allowing them to access the Networked control 
systems (NCS) through the water company’s IT network. 
4. Once the threat actor(s) have administrative access, they launch a Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attack against the regulatory control layer of the SCADA 
system.  This layer interacts with the physical water system through field 
devices. These field devices engage with Programmable Logic Controllers 
(PLC). 
5. Through the DoS attack, the PLCs are unable to control the pumps and 
valves they have been assigned to.  This causes the pumps and valves to 
malfunction.  In one part of the water service area, the pump malfunctions 
causing water distribution pipes to burst.  This results in disabled water 
service in this area.  In another part of the service area, the valve failures 
cause an incorrect amount of water treatment chemicals (Chlorine) to be 
applied to the water supply.  This makes the water unsafe to drink 
resulting in citizens becoming ill and requiring medical care. 
6. The DoS attack also affects the PLCs that control the wastewater 
treatment process.  This results in an overflow of untreated sewage into 
public waterways.   
C. Secondary Hazards/Events 
1. Environmental issues pertaining to contaminated water, land and 
equipment will arise. 
2. Decreased water pressure into fire hydrants will result in downgraded fire 
service capabilities. 
3. The raw sewage and the under/over treated water will cause many to 
become ill taxing the emergency medical system and hospitals in the area. 
4. Loss of water pressure will negatively impact the industrial processes at 
several local chemical plants. 
VIII. KEY IMPLICATIONS 
A. There will be direct human fatalities or injuries. 
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B. The public’s loss of confidence in the water supply will have significant 
psychological effects on the population. 
C. The limited water pressure in some areas, combined with the wastewater spillage 
in other areas, could drive more citizens to rely on the under/over treated water 
adding to the medical impact of the event. 
D. Due to the geographic dispersion of the water infrastructure and the dispersion of 
effects, significant resources will be required to repair the water and wastewater 
infrastructure. 
E. The environmental impact will be significant. 
F. Other sectors of US critical infrastructure could be affected due to their first-order 
dependence on the water sector.  These sectors include Energy, Emergency 
Services, Chemical, Information Technology, and Transportation.  According to 
DHS, these sectors are dependent on water for daily operations, production 
processes, cooling, firefighting, and sanitation. 
IX. INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS 
A. Emergency Assessment 
Investigations by law enforcement, DHS, and the water company using 
various methods of cyber analysis and forensics will take place to 
determine attribution and identify the location from where the attack was 
launched. 
B. Initial Emergency Response 
1. There will be central coordination between the State of South Carolina, the 
private sector, the federal government, and local government in both the 
crisis and consequence management responses. 
2. The SERT will provide support to local emergency management agencies 
in consequence management and environmental response. 
3. South Carolina and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will 
emphasize the need for identifying the network vulnerabilities that were 
exploited and the attack methodology used so the threat can be mitigated 
at other utilities located within South Carolina and the U.S. 
4. Public information will be critical to lessen the physical and psychological 
impacts of the event. 
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C. Incident/Hazard Characteristics 
1. Pre-incident 
a) Due to the nature of the event, hazard mitigation may prove 
difficult. 
b) Pre-identifying the dependencies and inter-dependencies will assist 
planners in identifying cascading effects. 
c) Developing strong working relationships with utility 




(1) A clean, sustainable supply of water will be required to not 
only lessen the physical impact but to calm the fears of the 
public. 
(2) The logistics involved in providing support to the medical, 
environmental, and meeting the basic needs of the public 
will need to be determined and adjusted as required 
throughout the event. 
(3) The duration of the water loss, and the economic 
implications of the event will be assessed based on the 
extent of the damages. 
b) Long-term 
(1) Equitable indemnification and when to begin reconstitution 
of the herds to begin economic recovery will be a major 
consideration. 
(2) The public and private sector businesses should be well 
informed to help mitigate the long-term economic and 
physical effects. 
D. Public Protection 
The public should be well informed of the threat and impact of the event 
to the human population, pets, livestock, and the environment. 
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E. Victim Care 
Individuals will require medical care, separation from the environmental 
impacts and a sustainable temporary supply of fresh water. 
F. Investigation/Apprehension 
Investigation and apprehension will involve the pursuit of a criminal 
investigation involving law enforcement, homeland security and cyber 
experts. 
G. Recovery/Remediation 
1. Water supply and waste water infrastructure will need to be repaired and 
disinfected. 
2. Environmental impact will need to be mitigated. 
3. Any individual and/or public assistance will be required. 
X. STATE RESPONSE 
A. The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) is the primary State 
agency for crisis management. 
B. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) is 
the primary State agency for consequence management. 
C. Secondary responsible agencies are South Carolina Emergency Management 
Division (SCEMD) and the South Carolina Department of Agriculture (SCDA). 
D. SERT Actions 
1. SCEMD will initially increase its response posture to support the affected 
jurisdiction. 
2. State resources will be made available to assist in the response, recovery 
and mitigation of the event. 
3. The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) will activate at OPCON 
4. 
4. The following ESFs will activate: 3 (Public Works), 4 (Firefighting), 6 
(Mass Care), 8 (Health and Medical Services), 10 (Hazardous Materials), 
12 (Energy), 13 (Law Enforcement), 15 (Public Information), 17 
(Animal/Agriculture Emergency Response), and 24 (Business and 
Industry).  Additional ESFs may activate as required to support the State’s 
response. 
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5. The State Emergency Response Team (SERT) may recommend the 
Governor activate the State Emergency Operations Plan and/or the Cyber 
Incident Framework. 
6. Begin support activities between the counties and the State. 
7. The SEOC will implement the appropriate EMAC agreements and begin 
assessment of additional needs. 
8. The SEOC will notify FEMA Region IV. 
9. Establish the Unified Command Structure. 
E. Resources Available For Responses 
1. The SEOC will serve as the Point of Contact for resource support from the 
State. 
2. The primary state consequence response resource will be SCDHEC.  
3. The primary state investigative/criminal response resource will be SLED.  
XI. ACTIONS BY ESF 
A. ESF 3 (Public Works) 
Coordinate for resources to support utility and identify short-term 
mitigation measures to re-establish water service to effected area(s).  
B. ESF 4 (Firefighting) 
Coordinate with ESF 3and fire services in the affected area to ensure 
firefighters have adequate water supplies.  
C. ESF 6 (Mass Care) 
Coordinate with ARC, Salvation Army, and others as required to provide 
mass care operations in support of affected members of the public.  
D. ESF 8 (Health & Medical Services) 
Coordinate the support to public health providers and shelters.  
E. ESF 10 (Hazardous Materials) 
1. Coordinate with SCDHEC to activate teams and assets to assist in the 
local decontamination process. 
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2. Coordinate with SCDHEC who will liaise with the US Environmental 
Protection Agency as required.  
F. ESF 12 (Energy) 
Coordinate with energy providers to assess any impacts to their 
operations.  
G. ESF 13 (Law Enforcement) 
1. Coordinate with SLED who will lead the State’s law enforcement 
response. 
2. Coordinate with who SLED will liaise with federal law enforcement 
agencies involved in the response. 
H. ESF 15 (Public Information) 
Coordinate with local PIOs to provide general incident information to 
include public health information and updates in an effort to minimize 
public concerns and ensure accurate information. 
I. ESF 17 (Animal Emergency Response) 
Coordinate with CULPH who will coordinate with state and federal 
officials concerning impacts to pets and livestock.  
J. ESF 24 (Business and Industry) 
Coordinate with the SC Department of Commerce who will coordinate 
with industry representatives to mitigate the business impact and expedite 
the recovery of lost production and employment. 
XII. FEDERAL INTERFACE 
A. The Federal agencies tasked to respond include: 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
 Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
B. Other Federal agencies may be tasked if the investigation determines the event 
resulted from terrorism. 
